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Cast of Characters 
 
Ad Hoc Committee (“AHC”) – the Ad Hoc Committee was an unofficial committee 
composed of claimants against AMR Corporation and its subsidiaries. 
 
Allied Pilots Association (“APA”) – One of AMR’s three major labor unions. 
 
American Airlines Group, Inc. – American Airlines Group is the new company 
that resulted from the merger between US Airways and AMR. 
 
AMR Corporation – AMR Corporation was the parent company of American 
Airlines, along with several other subsidiaries, and the predecessor company to 
American Airlines Group Inc.  
 
Association of Professional Flight Attendants (“APFA”) – One of AMR’s three 
major labor unions. 
 
Clayton Plaintiffs – The Clayton Plaintiffs were a group of individuals that brought 
a private antitrust action against the proposed AMR-US Airways merger and objected 
to the confirmation of the plan. 
 
David J. Cook – Mr. Cook, an attorney with Cook Collection Attorneys, PLC, 
represented the Clayton Plaintiffs in their objections to the confirmation of the plan. 
 
Douglas Parker – Mr. Parker was the Chief Executive Officer of US Airways until 
the company merged with American Airlines. Following the merger, he became the 
Chief Executive Officer of American Airlines Group. 
 
Harvey Miller – Mr. Miller, an attorney with Weil, Gotshal, & Manges LLP, was 
the lead attorney representing AMR’s bankruptcy and restructuring process. 
 
Jack Butler – Mr. Butler, an attorney with Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher, & Flom 
LLP, represented the Unsecured Creditors’ Committee and played an essential role 
in the merger of American Airlines and US Airways. 
 
The Honorable Sean H. Lane – Judge Sean Lane was the bankruptcy judge in the 
Southern District of New York who presided over the AMR bankruptcy and 
restructuring process. 
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Thomas Horton – Mr. Horton became the Chief Executive Officer of AMR the day 
after his company filed for bankruptcy protection in November 2011. Following the 
merger, he became Chairman of the Board of Directors of American Airlines Group. 
 
Transport Workers Union (“TWU”) – One of AMR’s three major labor unions. 
TWU represented seven separate employee groups. 
 
Tracy Hope Davis – Ms. Davis was the United States Trustee for the Southern 
District of New York during the time of AMR’s Chapter 11 restructuring. 
 
Unsecured Creditors’ Committee (“OCC”) – The Unsecured Creditors’ 
Committee was a committee of creditors, appointed by the United States’ Trustee, 
who were instrumental in the successful reorganization and merger of American 
Airlines. 
 
US Airways – US Airways, one of the historic network carriers, merged with AMR 
Corporation to become American Airlines Group Inc. 
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I. Introduction 
 On November 29, 2011, AMR Corporation—the parent company of American 
Airlines—filed a voluntary petition in the Southern District of New York, declaring 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy. The Chapter 11 restructuring culminated in the merger 
between AMR Corp. and US Airways.  
 
 This paper seeks to outline, broadly, the steps that AMR Corp. took in order to 
achieve a successful reorganization of its company. Early negotiations with the 
company’s labor unions proved to be an essential component of the merger and 
ultimate success of the reorganization. An active Unsecured Creditors Committee 
became instrumental in the negotiations with US Airways and greatly influenced the 
decision to merge. An unexpected lawsuit, filed by the Department of Justice, which 
looked as if it might destroy the efforts of all affected parties, was ultimately a minor 
setback. Finally, a merger between two major airlines resulted in recoveries for all 
stakeholders and ended the two-year process. 
 
 This paper provides information regarding the process of a Chapter 11 
Bankruptcy and tells the story of perhaps the most successful reorganization of a 
major airline.   
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II. The Debtor’s Business 
  
Before 2013, AMR Corporation (“AMR”) was the publicly-traded parent 
corporation of American Airlines, a globally-recognized, legacy airline headquartered 
in Fort Worth, Texas. The airline traces its history to when Charles Lindbergh flew 
the first American Airlines flight from St. Louis to Chicago in 1934.1 After a corporate 
reorganization in 1982, American Airlines became AMR’s principal subsidiary.2 
American Airlines is a “network carrier,” a term that refers to "the surviving set of 
large [United States airline] carriers, most of which were established long before 
deregulation, that operate on a 'hub and spoke' traffic model, service a wide variety 
of both domestic and international destinations using multiple aircraft types, and 
have workforces relatively more senior than the newer entrants."3 “In 2000, American 
[Airlines] was the largest passenger airline in the world in terms of revenue and 
capacity,” yet by the time of filing for bankruptcy it ranked fifth globally (and fourth 
domestically) among passenger carriers.4 Shortly before the time of AMR’s 
bankruptcy filing, American Airlines had a fleet of over 600 jet aircraft, providing 
over 1,800 daily flights to destinations across North America, the Caribbean, Latin 
America, Europe, and Asia.5  
                                            
1 Affidavit of Isabella D. Goren. Case 11-15463. Doc. No. 4, p. 3. Soon after the 
successful flight of the Wright brothers in 1903, small courier companies formed in 
the United States, eighty of which were purchased in 1929 by the Aviation 
Corporation. A year later, the companies merged to become American Airways and 
would later change its name to American Airlines in 1934. American Airlines 
Overview: The Past, the Crisis, and the Recovery, Market Realist, 
https://perma.cc/5FX3-G9NJ. American Airlines began trading on the New York 
Stock Exchange on June 10, 1939. “History of American Airlines,” AMERICAN 
AIRLINES, https://perma.cc/G8ML-83EN.  
 
2 Affidavit of Isabella D. Goren, Case 11-15463, Doc. No. 4, p. 3. American Airlines 
reorganized in 1982, creating AMR Corporation as its parent company. Id. 
 
3 Other U.S. network carriers generally include Delta, United, and US Airways. In 
re AMR Corp., 477 B.R. 384, 395 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012).  
 
4 Id. 
 
5 Id. (Based on 11/1/2011 figures). 
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Additionally, AMR’s wholly-owned subsidiary, AMR Eagle Corporation 
(“Eagle”) owned two regional airlines that do business as “American Eagle”: American 
Eagle Airlines, Inc., and Executive Airlines, Inc.6 Pursuant to a capacity purchase 
agreement, an independent carrier operated the 300-aircraft American Eagle fleet as 
“American Connection” and fed passenger traffic to American Airlines with 
approximately 1,500 daily departures to over 175 destinations.7 In exchange for 
receiving all passenger revenue from those flights, American Airlines paid Eagle and 
American Connection for the services provided.8 
 
Altogether, AMR carriers provided over 3,000 daily flights to over 180 cities 
within the United States.9 AMR’s primary domestic markets were the New York, Los 
Angeles, Chicago, Dallas/Fort Worth, and Miami metropolitan areas.10 By focusing 
on smaller, regional markets, Eagle and American Connection connected fliers to 
American Airlines’ primary markets.11 To compete in the international flights 
market, American Airlines was a founding member of the Oneworld Alliance, where 
member airlines were able to provide a broader route network along with other perks 
                                            
 
6 After the restructuring and merger with US Airways, American Eagle is now 
composed of ten regional carriers that contribute 3,400 daily flights to 240 
destinations across the United States, the Caribbean, Mexico, and Canada. Three 
are subsidiaries of American Airlines Group: Envoy Air, Piedmont Airlines, and 
PSA Airlines. Seven others are contract carriers: Air Wisconsin, Compass, 
ExpressJet, Mesa, Republic, SkyWest, and Trans States. “American Airlines 
Group,” AMERICAN AIRLINES, https://perma.cc/F8XP-QMZJ.  
 
7 Affidavit of Isabella D. Goren, Case 11-15463. Doc. No. 4, pp. 3-4. (based on 
11/1/2011 figures). 
 
8 Id. 
 
9 Id. at 4. 
 
10 Id. 
 
11 Id. American Connection only provides connecting service to Chicago O’Hare 
Airport. 
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and benefits. At the time of filing, the member airlines of the Oneworld Alliance 
provided 8,400 daily departures in over 750 destinations across approximately 150 
countries.12 In 2010, international operations accounted for approximately 40% of 
AMR’s total operating revenue, with the greatest share coming from Caribbean and 
Latin American flights.13 Altogether, airfare composed approximately 87% of AMR’s 
total revenue.14  
 
At the time of filing, AMR employed more than 88,000 people across the globe 
with a majority of U.S. employees belonging to labor unions and subject to collective 
bargaining agreements.15 American Airlines alone had 65,000 employees, 70% of 
whom were represented by one of three labor unions operating under nine separate 
collective bargaining agreements negotiated pursuant to the Railway Labor Act.16 
 
 AMR’s “AAdvantage” frequent flyer program maintained approximately 67 
million members, providing mileage credits and related services in exchange for 
continued patronage of the airline and its affiliates.17  Approximately 11% of AMR’s 
total revenue came from marketing services, membership fees, service charges, and 
baggage handling fees.18 In addition to passenger flight services, AMR also provides 
                                            
12 Id.  
 
13 Id. MARKET REALIST, https://perma.cc/44ZH-89BN. By contrast, international 
flights in Asia only accounted for a considerably smaller share of AMR’s 
international presence. 
 
14 MARKET REALIST, https://perma.cc/4GQS-CB5E  
 
15 Affidavit of Isabella D. Goren. Case 11-15463. Doc. No. 4., p. 6. 
 
16 In re AMR Corp., 477 B.R. 384, 395-96 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“American's 
management and support staff employees, which include office and clerical 
employees, as well as its passenger service agents, representatives, and weight and 
balance planners, are excluded as they are not unionized”). 
 
17 Affidavit of Isabella D. Goren. Case 11-15463. Doc. No. 4, p. 5. 
 
18 Id. Based on 2010 figures. Membership fees came from AMR’s Admirals Club 
operations. Marketing services were in connection with the AAdvantage program. 
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over ninety million pounds of cargo weekly to cities across four continents.19 Cargo 
represented approximately 3% of AMR’s total operating revenue.20  
 
 In addition to the subsidiaries already mentioned, AMR held 100% of the 
equity (directly or indirectly) in American Airlines Realty (NYC) Holdings, Inc.,21 
Americas Ground Services, Inc., PMA Investment Subsidiary, Inc.,22 SC Investment, 
Inc.,23 Executive Ground Services, Inc.,24 Eagle Aviation Services, Inc.,25 Admirals 
Club, Inc.,26 Business Express Airlines, Inc.,27 Reno Air, Inc.,28 AA Real Estate 
Holding GP LLC,29 AA Real Estate Holding L.P.,30 American Airlines Marketing 
                                            
19 Id.  
 
20 MARKET REALIST, https://perma.cc/4GQS-CB5E  
 
21 American Airlines Realty (NYC) Holdings is a wholly-owned subsidiary of 
American Airlines. Corporate Ownership Statement, Case 11-15463. Doc. No. 2, p 5. 
 
22 Id. PMA Investment Subsidiary, Inc. (“PISI”) holds a membership interest in 
Parts Advantage, LLC. 
 
23 Id. at 9. SC Investment holds an ownership interest in Aerolineas Argentinas. 
 
24 Id. at 6. Executive Ground Services is wholly-owned by Executive Airlines, which 
is wholly-owned by AMR Eagle, which is wholly-owned by AMR.  
 
25 Id. Eagle Aviation is a wholly-owned subsidiary of AMR Eagle.  
 
26 Id. Admirals Club is a wholly-owned subsidiary of American Airlines.  
 
27 Id. Business Express Airlines is a wholly-owned subsidiary of AMR Eagle.  
 
28 Id. Reno Air is a wholly-owned subsidiary of American Airlines.  
 
29 Id. AA Real Estate Holding GP is a wholly-owned subsidiary of American 
Airlines.  
 
30 Id. at 8. 99.5% of AA Real Estate Holding L.P. is owned by American Airlines. 
COS paragraph 16, page 6. AA Real Estate Holding GP, LLC holds a general 
partnership interest in AA Real Estate Holding L.P.  
11 
 
Services LLC,31 American Airlines Vacations LLC,32 American Aviation Supply 
LLC,33 and American Airlines IP Licensing Holding, LLC.34 AMR also maintained 
varying levels of direct and indirect equity interest in Aerodespachos Colombia; S.A. 
AERCOL S.A.;35 Aerolineas Pacifico Atlantico, S.A.; Aerosan Airport Services S.A.; 
Aerosan S.A.; Airline Tariff Publishing Company; American Airlines de Mexico, 
S.A.;36 American Airlines de Venezuela, S.A.;37 American Airlines, Division de 
Servicios Aeroportuarios (R.D.), S.A.; American Beacon Advisors, Inc.; Avion 
Assurance, Ltd.; Caribbean Dispatch Services Limited; International Ground 
Services, S.A. de C.V.; Oneworld Alliance, LLC; Oneworld Management Company, 
Inc.; OMZ Venture, LLC; and Texas Aero Engine Services, LLC. 
 
                                            
 
31 Id. at 6. American Airlines Marketing Services is a wholly-owned subsidiary of 
American Airlines.  
 
32 Id. American Airlines Vacations is a wholly-owned subsidiary of American 
Airlines.. 
 
33 Id. at 6-7. American Aviation Supply is a wholly-owned subsidiary of American 
Airlines.  
 
34 Id. at 7. American Airlines IP Licensing is a wholly-owned subsidiary of American 
Airlines.  
 
35 Id. at 8 (“Americas Ground directly holds 100% of the ownership interests in 
Aerodespachos Colombia, S.A. AERCOL S.A.; American Airlines Division de 
Servicios Aerportuarios (R.D.), S.A.; Caribbean Dispatch Services Limited; and 
International Ground Services, S.A. de C.V.”). 
 
36 Id. American Airlines de Mexico is a wholly-owned subsidiary of American 
Airlines.  
 
37 Id. American Airlines de Venezuela is a wholly-owned subsidiary of American 
Airlines. 
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III. Events Leading to Filing for Chapter 11 
A. Historical Market Changes 
“Deregulation changed everything.”38 Prior to the passage of The Airline 
Deregulation Act of 1978,39 the U.S. airline industry “faced little market competition” 
due to federal regulation of licensing, ticket prices, airline routes, and market 
participants.40 Consequently, industry regulation prevented and otherwise 
disincentivized competitive airline ticket prices and discounts.41 Deregulation 
“transformed the entire landscape of the airline industry,” by allowing airlines to “set 
prices and establish flight schedules based on market forces.”42 This led to the “hub 
and spoke” business model of large network airlines like American Airlines but also 
allowed low-cost carriers like Southwest Airlines to enter the market as well.43 The 
growth of the low-cost carriers created an increase in air travel demand, allowing 
them to reap the benefits and increase their market share.44 From 1998 to 2012, the 
market share of low-cost carriers almost doubled.45 At the same time, large network 
                                            
38 In Re AMR Corp., 477 B.R. at 396. This section of the paper relies heavily upon 
Judge Lane’s summary of the events because several of the documents upon which 
he relies are filed with the court under seal. 
 
39 Pub.L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 
 
40 In Re AMR Corp., 477 B.R. at 396. 
 
41 Id.  
 
42 Id. 
 
43 Id. 
 
44 Id. As the opinion points out, in 1993 the Department of Transportation coined 
the term the “Southwest Effect” in reference to the new increase in air travel 
demand. See OFFICE OF AVIATION ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., THE 
AIRLINE DEREGULATION EVOLUTION CONTINUES: THE SOUTHWEST 
EFFECT (1993).   
 
45 In Re AMR Corp., 477 B.R. at 398. 
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carriers like American Airlines suffered from the competitive pricing due to bloated 
business infrastructure and high overhead costs.46  
 
Unable to compete with low-cost carriers on pricing, network carriers have 
sought to remain competitive by simultaneously “lowering their costs and prices as 
much as possible” while “offering more destinations, additional frequencies, and 
increased amenities.”47 A cornerstone of this strategy includes going after so-called 
“high value” customers (e.g., “business travelers and other frequent fliers”) who are 
willing to pay higher prices for additional benefits and convenience.48 The airline 
industry has also been subjected to further competition within the international air 
travel market as the United States has entered into “Open Skies Agreements” with 
105 countries since 1993.49 In line with related trade deals, these international 
agreements have allowed for market-driven competition alongside foreign airline 
companies, adding increased pressure on domestic airlines to lower costs and ticket 
prices.50 Moreover, internet-based ticket pricing and booking companies have 
increased price transparency by allowing consumers to compare ticket prices across 
all airlines.51 This has led to further downward pressure on ticket pricing.52  
 
Following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the airline industry saw 
a dramatic decline in demand which has been “further compounded by the increased 
inconvenience resulting from changes in passenger screening.”53 Significant increases 
in security and fuel prices—along with natural disasters (e.g., Hurricane Katrina), 
                                            
46 Id. at 396.  
 
47 Id. 
 
48 Id. 
 
49 Id. at 397. 
 
50 Id. 
 
51 Id.  
 
52 Id. 
 
53 Id. 
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health epidemics (e.g., the outbreak of the SARS virus), and ongoing concern 
regarding military action in the Middle East (e.g., Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria)—all 
further distressed the airline industry, too.54 
 
B. Factors Affecting American Airlines’ Decision to File for Chapter 11 
 In addition to the market forces affecting the airline industry, American 
Airlines suffered a series of setbacks from 2001-2011. Following the industry 
downturn following 9/11, US Airways,55 United Airlines, Northwest Airlines, and 
Delta Airlines each filed for bankruptcy protection and reorganization from 2002 to 
2005.56 This allowed American Airlines’ closest competitors to reduce their operating 
costs by renegotiating their collective bargaining agreements. In the years that 
followed, Delta merged with Northwest in 2008 and United Airlines merged with 
Continental in 2010, reducing the number of “legacy carriers” from six to four.57 At 
the time, American Airlines was able to avoid bankruptcy in part because of 
significant labor concessions from its unions in 2003.58 
 
Beginning in 2001, AMR started incurring major net losses each year until 
finally filing for bankruptcy in 2011. In 2008 and 2009, AMR recorded losses of $2.1 
billion and 1.5 billion, respectively.59 After another round of cost-saving measures in 
2010, AMR recorded a $451 million net loss.60 Finally, in 2011, the company recorded 
                                            
54 Id. 
 
55 That event was US Airways’ second Chapter 11 filing.  
 
56 Genevieve Shaw Brown, American Airlines: Timeline of Troubles, ABC NEWS (Oct. 
2, 2012), https://perma.cc/9HXQ-XSXE. 
 
57 Id. 
 
58 Andrew B. Dawson, Labor Activism in Bankruptcy, 89 AM. BANKR. L.J. 97, 118 
(2015). Labor costs alone were reduced by $1.8 billion. By 2004, the annual cost 
reduction was $4.1 billion. Affidavit of Isabella D. Goren. Case 11-15463. Doc. No. 4, 
p. 7. 
 
59 Brown, American Airlines: Timeline of Troubles, https://perma.cc/9HXQ-XSXE. 
 
60 Id.  
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a $1.06 billion net loss. Overall, AMR lost $10 billion since 2001.61 Due to the 
company’s weakening financial position, AMR addressed its liquidity needs with 
secured lending against “virtually all of its unencumbered assets,” leaving no 
additional assets to pledge as collateral for further financing.62 At the time of filing, 
most of AMR’s financing required interest rates that far exceeded the market rates 
of the low-interest post-recession environment.63 AMR’s financial position relative to 
its profit-earning competitors placed it in an additionally precarious position by 
preventing it from expanding its route network to keep up with competitors and by 
making investment in innovative products and services cost-prohibitive.64 
 
Of the network carriers, American Airlines faced the stiffest competition from 
low-cost carriers as at least one low-cost carrier operated in 49 of American Airlines’ 
top 50 routes.65 As a result, AMR discontinued several non-stop flights where airfare 
revenue decreased significantly (i.e., 60%) due to fierce competition, such as the route 
between Boston and San Francisco.66 Moreover, American Airlines incurred a 
significant financial blow when low-cost carriers began making inroads into the Latin 
American and Caribbean markets—two regions where AMR derived a significant 
portion of its revenue.67 While average ticket prices for this region decreased 9% from 
1998 to 2011, jet fuel prices were five times higher over the same period.68 Finally, 
                                            
 
61 Doug Cameron, Mike Spector, and Jack Nicas, American Lands in Bankruptcy, 
WALL STREET JOURNAL, (Nov. 30, 2011), https://perma.cc/S9UH-AYU2. American 
Airlines’ average negative net margin from 2003-2011 was -3.6%. In Re AMR Corp., 
477 B.R. at 397. 
 
62 Affidavit of Isabella D. Goren, Case 11-15463. Doc. No. 4, p. 6. 
 
63 Id. 
 
64 In Re AMR Corp., 477 B.R. at 397-98. 
 
65 Id. at 398. That number has gone up from 39 in 2003.  
 
66 Id. 
 
67 Id. 
 
68 Id. 
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several foreign airlines with terminals in “key international gateways” began cutting 
into American Airlines’ “high value” customer-base by offering “levels of in-flight 
service quality that exceed those offered by American.”69  
 
A common industry metric for the airline industry is the cost per available seat 
mile (“CASM”). American Airlines’ labor CASM exceeded that of its network airline 
competitors by 24% and low-cost carrier competitors by 79%.70 Consequently, 
American’s net CASM also exceeded all of its competitors. American’s high unit labor 
cost stemmed from its “relatively high wage scale for employees, pilots, and flight 
attendants; generous benefits; and a more senior workforce.”71 This problem was 
compounded by American having particularly low productivity among its employees 
and pilots.72 American’s pilot labor costs alone were $1.8 billion per year and made 
up nearly a third of total labor costs—a fact even the Allied Pilots’ Association (AMR’s 
in-house pilot union) conceded was “unsustainable.”73 
 
Finally, beginning in 1986, American Airlines suffered from a series of 
unsuccessful mergers. In 1986, AMR paid $225 million to acquire low-cost carrier 
AirCal in order to give the company a foothold in San Jose and the infrastructure 
needed to be competitive throughout California.74 In 1987, AirCal was integrated into 
American’s operations. Unfortunately, this strategic acquisition occurred precisely 
during the same period that US Airways and low-cost carrier Southwest Airlines were 
also moving to compete along the West Coast.75 American and US Airways were not 
                                            
 
69 Id. at 399. Foreign airlines have also increased competition with Oneworld 
Alliance, of which American Airlines is a charter member. 
 
70 Id. 
 
71 Id. 
 
72 Id. at 400. 
 
73 Id. 
 
74 Terry Maxon, American Airlines Battles a History of Unsuccessful Mergers, Dallas 
Morning News (Jan. 2013), https://perma.cc/3EQA-UJQT. 
 
75 Id. 
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able to compete with Southwest along the California corridor because of Southwest’s 
superior cost structure.76 By 1993, American had completely terminated its presence 
in medium and minor California hubs.77   
 
By the late 1990s, however, the Silicon Valley “bloom of soaring stock values” 
and IPOs led to a resurgence of “high value” customers demanding air travel. 
American sought to reenter the market with the late 1998 purchase of Reno Air, a 
low-cost carrier begun just six years earlier.78 Within three months of the acquisition, 
the pilots’ union staged a “sickout” to protest the ongoing debate over integrating 
Reno Air’s pilots into the larger AMR workforce.79 The sickout ended up costing AMR 
$200 million in lost revenue, which was more than the company paid for Reno Air.80 
 
In January 2001, Trans World Airlines (“TWA”) and American announced they 
had reached a $2.8 billion deal where TWA would file for bankruptcy and American 
would purchase TWA’s assets in bankruptcy court, assume its obligations, and hire 
its employees.81 The acquisition was motivated by United Airlines’ announced merger 
with US Airways. However, due to antitrust concerns and Justice Department 
opposition, the United-US Air merger collapsed shortly thereafter while AMR was 
allowed to proceed with the purchase of TWA.82 Five months after the merger, 
terrorists hijacked and crashed two American and two United jets. This had a 
devastating effect on the entire airline industry and on the economy—causing a rapid 
decline in the high-value customers on which network carriers depended.83 While 
                                            
 
76 Id. 
 
77 Id. 
 
78 Id. 
 
79 Id. 
 
80 Id. 
 
81 Id. 
 
82 Id. 
 
83 Id. 
19 
 
many attribute the failure of the TWA merger to these unforeseen external shocks, 
other industry experts assert that American Airlines based the strategic acquisition 
on a mistaken belief that TWA—particularly the St. Louis hub—gave American 
something it lacked.84 In actuality, the acquisition failed to offer American any 
breadth or depth in new markets or target areas and by 2009 AMR had laid off a 
plurality of former TWA employees along with closing the former-TWA hub in St. 
Louis and Kansas City maintenance base.85  
 
                                            
 
84 Id. 
 
85 Id. 
 
20 
 
IV. Financing Issues 
 According to the affidavit of Isabella Goren, AMR’s Chief Financial Officer, 
AMR came into bankruptcy with over $4.1 billion in unrestricted cash.86 As a result, 
AMR did not pursue cash collateral or other financing as debtors-in-possession. 
Initially, the U.S. Trustee raised its concerns with the court that AMR’s cash position 
was not in compliance with 11 U.S.C. § 345 (i.e., had not secured bonds for the 
unrestricted cash) insofar as AMR had not repatriated all of its cash—raising the 
issue whether such funds needed to comply with § 345.87 Judge Lane took a decidedly 
pragmatic view, making it clear to the U.S. Trustee that full compliance was 
unrealistic and that both the debtor and the Trustee should find a realistic, although 
incomplete, solution to the problem.88 
 
 Several analysts have pointed out that the eventual success of the AMR 
restructuring is in no small part due to the wisdom of AMR going into bankruptcy 
protection with $4.8 billion in unrestricted cash and short-term investments. That 
strategy paid dividends (so to speak) by allowing both the Unsecured Creditors 
Committee and the Ad Hoc Committee to focus solely on AMR’s long-term problems 
without any consideration of any creditors’ short-term profit positions from DIP 
financing. Moreover, the $4.8 billion appeared to give AMR greater bargaining power 
since it entered bankruptcy protection “early,” and thus preventing any vendor, 
creditor, or competitor from placing AMR in a further precarious position. AMR went 
on to renegotiate financing on more than four hundred aircraft,89 nine thousand 
                                            
86 Affidavit of Isabella D. Goren. Case 11-15463. Doc. No. 4, p. 13. See also 
Transcript of Hearing on Dec. 22, 2011, Case 11-15463. Doc. No. 465, p. 56 (stating 
AMR’s cash position was closer to $4.8 billion). 
 
87 Transcript of Hearing on Dec. 22, 2011, Case 11-15463. Doc. No. 465, p. 55-60. 
 
88 Id. at 59. 
 
89 Motion of Debtors for Entry of Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105(a), 363(b), and 
503(b) Authorizing and Approving (i) Merger Agreement Among AMR Corporation, 
AMR Merger Sub, Inc., and US Airways Group, Inc., (ii) Debtors’ Execution of and 
Performance Under Merger Agreement, (iii) Certain Employee Compensation and 
Benefit Arrangements, (iv) Termination Fees, and (v) Related Relief. Case 11-
15463. Doc. No. 6800, p. 10. 
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vendor contracts,90 and five hundred real estate leases.91 The debtors also 
restructured aircraft leases, thereby reducing annual rent payments by over one 
billion dollars,92 and eliminated a total of $2.5 billion in unsecured and tax exempt 
debt.93 It appears fair to say that AMR derived its success in these renegotiations and 
restructurings from entering bankruptcy protection from a position of strength.  
 
  
                                            
90 Id.  
 
91 Id. 
 
92 Id.  
 
93 Id. 
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V. First Day Motions 
 At the same time that AMR filed for bankruptcy protection, the company also 
filed a series of first day motions intended to enable the corporation and its 
subsidiaries to continue doing business while the bankruptcy restructuring process 
unfolded. Using the categories provided in Bankruptcy in Practice, “first-day motions” 
fall under one of three categories: (i) Orders that facilitate the administration of 
AMR’s estate; (ii) Orders that smooth the day-to-day operations; and (iii) Orders 
authorizing AMR to honor its prepetition obligations.94 It should be stated from the 
outset that only a few objections were raised to these motions, many of which were 
withdrawn or resolved before the court held a hearing on the matter. 
 
A. Orders Facilitating Administration of the Estate 
AMR filed its voluntary petition in the Southern District of New York, using 
its New York real estate holding company as the link for venue purposes.95 As debtors 
in possession (under §§ 1107(a) and 1108 of the Bankruptcy Code), AMR and its 
subsidiaries moved for and were granted joint administration of the Chapter 11 cases 
under Rule 1015(B) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.96 Joint 
administration allowed AMR and its subsidiaries to file joint motions and other 
documents under the lead bankruptcy case for each company’s bankruptcy cases, 
thereby reducing administrative expenses.  
 
AMR also requested that Judge Lane use the Bankruptcy Court’s powers under 
§ 105 to allow AMR not to file the list of creditors as required under § 521(a)(1) 
                                            
94 BERNSTEIN & KUNEY, BANKRUPTCY IN PRACTICE (5TH ED.) 273-75. 
 
95 It is notable that AMR elected to proceed through bankruptcy in New York rather 
than Texas. Analysts have pointed out that it is commonplace for large public 
corporations to file for bankruptcy in Delaware or the Southern District of New 
York because of the sophistication of the judges in those districts. See, e.g., Andrew 
B. Dawson, Labor Activism in Bankruptcy, 89 AM. BANKR. L.J. 97, 118 (2015). 
 
96 Motion for Joint Administration, Case 11-15463. Doc. No. 3, p. 5; 11 U.S.C. See 
also Sections 11 U.S.C. 1107(a), 1108 (2016); BERNSTEIN & KUNEY, BANKRUPTCY IN 
PRACTICE (5TH ED.) 13; FED. R. BANKR. P. 1015(b). 
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because the debtors planned to employ a claims and noticing agent.97 This common 
procedure (allowed under 28 U.S.C. § 156(c) and supported by local court order M-
409) requires debtors to retain a claims and noticing agent in cases with one thousand 
or more creditors and/or equity security holders. Because the claims and noticing 
agent receives all of the pertinent information regarding creditors and equity 
stakeholders, filing such lists with the court had no further utility.98 In the same 
motion, AMR provided the court with its proposed procedures for serving the notice 
of commencement in lieu of contacting each potential claimant. AMR’s procedures 
included publishing notices in each of the following: the New York Times, Wall Street 
Journal, Financial Times, USA Today, Chicago Tribune, Dallas Morning News, 
Miami Herald, and the Los Angeles Times.99 
 
In addition to providing the court with a plan for giving notice of 
commencement, AMR also filed a motion requesting that the court authorize the 
debtors to establish procedures for protecting the value of the company’s tax 
attributes.100 Essentially, AMR asked the court for the authority to protect itself from 
hostile investors or claims traders who might take advantage of AMR’s vulnerable 
position in a way that would be harmful to the restructuring process.  
 
                                            
97 Motion of Debtors for Entry of Order Waiving Requirement to File List of 
Creditors and Granting Debtors Authority to Establish Procedures for Notifying 
Creditors of Commencement of Debtors’ Chapter 11 Cases. Case 11-15463. Doc. No. 
5, pp. 2-3. 
 
98 Under FED. R. BANKR. P. 2002(a), the claims agent is required to provide all 
creditors and indenture trustees twenty-one days’ notice of the § 341 creditors 
meeting. 
 
99 Motion of Debtors for Entry of Order Waiving Requirement to File List of 
Creditors and Granting Debtors Authority to Establish Procedures for Notifying 
Creditors of Commencement of Debtors’ Chapter 11 Cases. Case 11-15463. Doc. No. 
5, pp. 5-6. 
 
100 Motion of Debtors Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105(a) and 362 for Entry of Order (i) 
Establishing Notification Procedures and Approving Restrictions on Certain 
Transfers of Claims Against and Interests in the Debtors’ Estates, and (ii) 
Scheduling Final Hearing. Case 11-15463. Doc. No. 20, pp. 2-3. 
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AMR filed a motion to extend the time from fourteen to seventy-five days to 
file schedules of its (and its subsidiaries’) assets and liabilities, executory contracts 
and unexpired leases, along with its financial statements.101 The same motion 
requested that AMR not be required to file a list of all of its equity holders with the 
court or provide them with notice of the § 341 meeting in addition to the public 
advertisements the debtors would pursue. Because of the enormity and complexity of 
the debtors, it appeared to be an obvious request that the court would definitely grant. 
Moreover, in the CFO’s affidavit, AMR provided the court with the list of its five 
largest equity security holders, which served as a good faith effort by the debtors to 
comply. 
 
In order to keep the company running, AMR filed a motion to grant 
administrative expense status to AMR’s critical vendors.102 In doing this, the 
company sought the Court’s blessing for the uninterrupted continuation of its current 
business—a vital aspect of the restructuring process. Because administrative 
claimants are given priority over other creditors, several suppliers such as BAE 
Systems and FADEC International objected on grounds that their companies should 
be included among the “critical vendors,” too. Along those same lines, in another 
motion AMR sought court authorization to continue using its existing cash 
                                            
101 Motion of Debtors for Entry of Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105(a) and 521, 
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1007(c), 2002(d), 2015.3, and 9006, and Local Bankruptcy Rule 
1007-1 (i) Extending Time to file Schedules of Executory Contracts and Unexpired 
Leases, Statements of Financial Affairs, and Reports of Financial Information; and 
(ii) Waiving Requirement to File List of Equity Security Holders and Provide Notice 
to Equity Security Holders. Case 11-15463. Doc. No. 6, p. 3. 
 
102 Motion of Debtors for Entry of Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 363(c)(1) and 
504(b)(1)(A) Granting Administrative Expense Status to Undisputed Obligations to 
Vendors Arising from Postpetition Delivery of Goods and Services Ordered 
Prepetition and Authorizing Debtors to Pay Such Obligations in Ordinary Course of 
Business. Case 11-15463. Doc. No. 7, pp. 2-3. The motion divided the critical 
vendors into categories: (1) safety and security providers, (2) airline parts suppliers, 
(3) maintenance service providers, (4) flight training providers, (5) customer and 
cargo handling, (6) flight navigation systems providers, and (7) crew and employee-
related providers. 
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management systems and to maintain existing bank accounts.103 Moving all of the 
estate’s property (including all of the money and accounts receivable) is an onerous 
requirement for multinational corporations such as AMR. As a result, judges 
(including Judge Lane here) are inclined to use their “necessary or appropriate” 
powers under § 105(a) to allow the debtor to continue using its existing bank accounts 
and cash management system.  
 
In an effort for certain proprietary information to remain private, AMR filed a 
motion to file its executory credit card and payment agreements under seal.104 This 
allowed AMR to keep private its business (i.e., incentive-based credit cards) with 
Citibank, Diners Club International, Discover Financial Services, PayPal, and 
several others.105 In doing this, AMR was protecting any competitive edge it may have 
had or might gain in the future.  
 
Approximately six weeks later, AMR sought court authorization for three final 
matters related to the ongoing business of the company. AMR sought and the court 
authorized the debtors to set up procedures for the payment of professionals (i.e., 
attorneys, tax professionals, financial advisors, and investment bankers) employed 
in connection with the bankruptcy and restructuring process.106 Included in this list 
                                            
103 Motion of Debtors for Entry of Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105(a), 345(b), 
363(b), 363(c), and 364(a) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 6003 and 6004 (A) Authorizing 
Debtors to (i) Continue Using Existing Cash Management System, (ii) Honor 
Certain Prepetition Obligations Related to the Use Thereof, and (iii) Maintain 
Existing Bank Accounts and Business Forms; (B) Extending Time to Comply with 
11 U.S.C. § 345(b); and (C) Scheduling a Final Hearing. Case 11-15463. Doc No. 8, 
pp. 2-3. 
 
104 Motion of Debtors for Entry of Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 107(B) and Rule 
9018 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure Authorizing Filing of Certain 
Executory Credit Card and Payment Agreements Under Seal. Case 11-15463. Doc. 
No. 22, pp. 2-3. 
 
105 Id. Exhibit A at p. 7. 
 
106 Motion of Debtors for Entry of Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105(a) and 331 
Establishing Procedures for Interim Compensation and Reimbursement of 
Expenses of Professionals. Case 11-15463. Doc. No. 583, pp. 5-7. 
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of professionals, AMR sought approval to employ five separate law firms and three 
separate bankruptcy/financial consulting firms. Additionally, the Creditors 
Committee retained its own law firms and financial advisors, which were included in 
this list of professionals. Along those same lines, the court granted approval for AMR 
to employ accounting firms used in the ordinary course of business for tax and other 
accounting matters.107 Overall, AMR employed forty-five separate tax and accounting 
firms to handle both its domestic and international business. Lastly, the court 
granted AMR the authority to continue employing professionals used in the ordinary 
course of business.108 
 
B. Orders That Smooth Day-to-Day Operations 
 AMR filed three separate motions seeking the court’s authorization to 
establish procedures for the treatment of claims brought under § 503(b)(9), the 
Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act, and reclamation claims brought under § 
546(c). There were several initial objections to these procedures but were withdrawn 
or resolved consensually before the court held the hearing on the motion.109  
                                            
107 Motion of Debtors for Entry of Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105(a), 327, 328, 
330, and 363(c) for Authorization to Employ Certain Firms and Individuals Used in 
the Ordinary Course of Business to Handle Tax and Other Matters Nunc Pro Tunc 
to the Commencement Date. Case 11-15463. Doc. No. 589, pp. 5-6. 
 
108 Motion of Debtors for Entry of Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105(a), 327, 328, 
and 330 for Authorization to Employ Professionals Used in the Ordinary Course of 
Business Nunc Pro Tunc to the Commencement Date. 11-15463. Doc. No. 319, pp. 5-
6. 
 
109 Transcript of Hearing on Dec. 13, 2011. Case 11-15463. Doc. No. 411, p. 8. See 
also Motion of Debtors for Entry of Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105 and 546(c) 
Establishing and Implementing Exclusive and Global Procedures for Treatment of 
Reclamation Claims. Case 11-15463. Doc. No. 13, pp. 2-3; Motion of Debtors for 
Entry of Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105(a) and 503(b)(9) Establishing 
Procedures for the Assertion, Resolution, and Satisfaction of Claims Asserted 
Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(9). Case 11-15463. Doc. No. 14, pp. 2-4; Motion of 
Debtors for Entry of Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) for Establishment of 
Procedures for Treatment of Claims Pursuant to Perishable Agricultural 
Commodities Act. Case 11-15463. Doc. No. 15, pp. 2-4. 
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 The debtors’ proposed form of assurance to pay utilities, however, ignited 
stronger disagreement than the claims procedures. Four separate entities filed 
objections to the motion but the court saw to it that each utility received adequate 
assurance and preserved the right to seek additional assurance in the future if 
conditions changed.110  
 
C. Orders Authorizing AMR to Honor Prepetition Obligations 
 In this category, AMR sought court approval to continue honoring the 
company’s prepetition obligations. These motions covered wages (along with other 
compensation & benefits),111 insurance programs and obligations,112 shipping and 
                                            
110 Transcript of Hearing on December 22, 2011. Case 11-15463. Doc. No. 465, p. 54. 
See also Motion of Debtors for Entry of Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105(a) and 
366 (i) Approving Debtors’ Proposed Form of Adequate Assurance of Payment to 
Utilities, (ii) Establishing Procedures for Resolving Objections By Utility 
Companies, and (iii) Prohibiting Utilities from Altering, Refusing, or Discontinuing 
Service. Case 11-15463. Doc. No. 21. 
 
111 Motion of Debtors for Entry of Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105(a) and 363(b) 
Authorizing (i) Payment of Prepetition Wages, Salaries, and Other Compensation 
and Benefits, (ii) Maintenance of Employee Benefit Programs and Payment of 
Related Administrative Obligations, and (iii) Applicable Banks and Other Financial 
Institutions to Receive, Process, Honor, and Pay All Checks Presented for Payment 
and to Honor All Fund Transfer Requests. Doc. No. 9, pp. 2-3. 
 
112 Motion of Debtors for Entry of Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105(a), 362(d), 
363(b), and 503(b) (i) Authorizing, But Not Directing, Debtors to (a) Continue Their 
Insurance Programs, and (b) Pay All Insurance Obligations, (ii) Modifying the 
Automatic Stay with Respect to Workers’ Compensation Claims, and (iii) 
Authorizing and Directing Financial Institutions to Honor and Process Related 
Checks and Transfers. Doc. No. 18, pp. 2-3. 
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delivery charges,113 obligations to foreign creditors,114 customer programs,115 
obligations to critical vendors,116 taxes and assessments,117 fuel supply 
                                            
113 Motion of Debtors for Entry of Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105 and 363(b) 
Authorizing Payment of Certain Prepetition (i) Shipping and Delivery Charges for 
Goods in Transit and (ii) Customs Duties and Charges. Doc. No. 17, pp. 2-3. 
 
114 Motion of Debtors for Entry of Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 363(b) and 105(a) 
(i) Authorizing Debtors to Pay Prepetition Obligations Owed to Foreign Creditors, 
(ii) Authorizing and Directing Financial Institutions to Honor and Process Related 
Checks and Transfers, and (iii) Scheduling Final Hearing. Doc. No. 11, pp. 2-3.  
 
115 Motion of Debtors for Entry of Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105(a) and 363(c) 
(i) Authorizing the Debtors to Pay and Honor Prepetition Obligations to Customers 
and to Otherwise Continue Customer Programs and Practices in the Ordinary 
Course of business, and (ii) Authorizing and Directing the Disbursement Banks to 
Honor and Process Related Checks and Transfers. Doc. No. 12, pp. 2-3. 
 
116 Motion of Debtors for Entry of Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105(a) and 363(b) 
(i) Authorizing, But Not Directing, Debtors to Pay Prepetition Obligations of 
Critical Vendors, (ii) Authorizing and Directing Financial Institutions to Honor and 
Process Related Checks and Transfers, and (iii) Scheduling Final Hearing. Doc. No. 
10, pp. 2-3.  
 
117 Motion of Debtors for Entry of Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105(a), 363(b), 
507(a)(8), and 541 (i) Authorizing, But Not Directing, Debtors to Pay Prepetition 
Taxes and Assessments, and (ii) Authorizing and Directing Financial Institutions to 
Honor and Process Related Checks and Transfers. Doc. No. 19, pp. 2-3. 
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arrangements,118 letter of credit and surety bond programs,119 assumption certain 
executory credit card and payment agreements,120 interline agreements,121 and 
independent contractors and improvement projects.122 As is stated earlier, the only 
objections to these motions were either withdrawn, resolved, or filed as limited 
                                            
118 Motion of Debtors for Entry of Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105(a), 362, 363, 
and 553 (i) Authorizing, But Not Directing, Fuel Supply Parties to Apply 
Prepetition Prepayments and Credits to Prepetition and Postpetition Obligations 
Under Fuel Supply Arrangements, (ii) Authorizing, But Not Directing, Debtors to 
Pay Prepetition Amounts Owed to fuel Supply Parties, (iii) Authorizing, But Not 
Directing, Debtors to Honor, Perform, and Exercise Their Rights and Obligations 
Under Fuel Supply Arrangements, and (iv) Authorizing and Directing Financial 
Institutions to Honor and Process Related Checks and Transfers. Doc. No. 24, p. 3. 
 
119 Motion of Debtors for Entry of Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 363, 364 and 365 
Authorizing Debtors to (a) Continue and Renew Their Letter of Credit and Surety 
Bond Programs, (b) Continue Corporate Credit Card Program, and (c) Assume a 
Certain Executory Contract. Doc. No. 27, pp. 2-3. 
 
120 Motion of Debtors for Entry of Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 365(a) and Fed. R. 
Bankr. P. 6006 Approving Assumption of Certain Executory Credit Card and 
Payment Agreements. Doc. No. 23, pp. 2-3. 
 
121 Motion of Debtors for Entry of Order (i) Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105(a) and 
365(a) Approving Assumption of Interline Agreements, Clearinghouse Agreements, 
ARC Agreements, Billing and Settlement Plan Contracts, Cargo Agreements, 
Oneworld Agreements, and Alliance Agreements, (ii) Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 
105(a) and 363(b) Authorizing Debtors to Honor Prepetition Obligations Related to 
Carrier Services Agreements, Connection Carrier Agreement, GDS Participation 
Carrier Agreements, Travel Agency Agreements, Booking and Online Fulfillment 
Agreements, Cargo Agency Agreements, ATPCO Agreement, Deeds of Undertaking 
and Related Agreements, and (iii) Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362 Modifying the 
Automatic Stay to the Extent Necessary to Effectuate the Requested Relief. Doc. 
No. 25, pp. 2-3. 
 
122 Motion of Debtors for Entry of Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105 and 363(b) 
Authorizing Payment of Prepetition (i) Claims of Independent Contractors and (ii) 
Claims Related to Improvement Projects. Doc. No. 16, pp. 2-3. 
 
30 
 
objections so as to reserve the rights of the objecting parties to be able to object in the 
future.123
                                            
123 See generally Transcripts of Hearings on 11/29/11, 12/13/11, 12/22/11, & 2/3/12. 
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VI. Appointment of Committees 
A. The Unsecured Creditors’ Committee 
 On December 5, 2011, the United States Trustee appointed the Official 
Committee of Unsecured Creditors (“the OCC”), which consisted of nine members.124 
These nine members consisted of the Allied Pilots Association, the Association of 
Professional Flight Attendants, Bank of New York Mellon, Boeing Capital 
Corporation, Hewlett Packard Enterprises Services, LLC, Manufacturers and 
Traders Trust Company, the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, the 
Transportation Workers Union of America, and the Wilmington Trust Company.125 
 
 Unlike in smaller cases, where there may be no unsecured creditors’ committee 
or the unsecured creditors’ committee plays an insignificant role in the chapter 11 
process, the OCC in this case sought “to work the debtors to achieve a feasible and 
expeditious transformation of American Airlines . . . and effectively fulfill the [OCC’s] 
fiduciary and oversight responsibility.”126 Thus, the OCC intended to, and ultimately 
did, play an essential role in the successful reorganization of American Airlines. 
 
B. The Ad Hoc Committee 
 In April 2012, certain holders of American Airlines’ unsecured debt contacted 
counsel in order to secure representation with respect to the unsecured debt.127 By 
December 2012, these holders of unsecured debt formed the Ad Hoc Committee, 
which was comprised of parties who held a claim or managed accounts that held 
claims against American Airlines, as represented in the charts below: 
                                            
124 Statement of the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors’ Regarding Matters 
to Be Heard on December 22, 2011. Case 11-15463. Doc. No. 403, p. 2. 
 
125 Id. 
 
126 Id. at 4. See also 11. U.S.C. § 1102(a)(3) (2016) (“On request of a party in 
interest, in a case in which the debtor is a small business debtor and for cause, the 
court may order that a committee of creditors not be appointed”); BERNSTEIN & 
KUNEY, BANKRUPTCY IN PRACTICE (5TH ED.) 20-21.  
 
127 Supplemental Verified Statement of the Ad Hoc Committee of AMR Corporation 
Creditors Pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 2019. Doc. No. 5585, 
p. 1. 
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128 Id. at 4-6. 
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VII. Union Disputes and Rejection of Collective Bargaining 
Agreements 
A. Labor Costs, History, and Lead Up 
 One of the biggest reasons for AMR’s Chapter 11 bankruptcy had to do with its 
employees. In light of the reorganizations of fellow competitors, AMR acknowledged 
that its need to restructure was due, in part, to high labor costs.129 In Chief Financial 
Officer Isabella Goren’s affidavit, she said that the “airline industry is labor 
intensive,” and AMR had high labor costs and was simply unable to compete in that 
area.130 At the time the petition was filed, AMR employed 88,000 people.131 Though 
employees’ pay rates were comparable to those employed by other network carriers, 
AMR was losing money in labor costs, as measured per available seat mile, which 
gauges the productivity of an airline worker.132 At the time of filing, AMR’s labor costs 
per available seat mile were 24% higher than the other network carriers with which 
the company was competing.133 Specifically, AMR’s total labor costs for pilots was 
$1.8 billion per year, which constituted about 30% of American’s total labor costs.134 
In light of such high, controllable costs, in February 2012, less than three months 
after the petition, AMR unveiled its new business plan and notified its unions that it 
planned to cut 13,000 of its 88,000 jobs.135  
 
                                            
129 Affidavit of Isabella D. Goren. Case 11-15463. Doc. No. 4, p. 28. 
 
130 Id. 
 
131 Jad Mouawad, American Airlines Seeks 13,000 Job Cuts, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 1, 
2012), https://perma.cc/XM28-UAM3.  
 
132 Memorandum in Support of Debtors' Motion to Reject Collective Bargaining 
Agreements. Case 11-15463. Doc. No. 2041, p. 35. 
 
133 Id. at 44. 
 
134 In Re AMR Corp., 477 B.R. at 400. 
 
135 Chris Isidore, American Airlines Plans to Cut 13,000 Jobs, CNN MONEY (Feb. 1, 
2012), https://perma.cc/C6GF-3EV8.  
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 AMR employees had become accustomed to the company’s employment flux 
and seeming disregard for its employees. In the 2001 merger with Trans World 
America (“TWA”), AMR acquired 20,000 new employees.136 Later that year, after the 
terrorist attacks on September 11, AMR eliminated 20,000 jobs from its workforce.137 
Then again, in 2002, the airline company laid off 7,000 employees.138 In an effort to 
avoid bankruptcy and cut costs, AMR, the world’s biggest airline at the time, 
promised to cut 7% of its workforce by March 2003.139 In 2003, employees again 
“agreed to significant and painful cost reductions.”140 Employees were encouraged to 
accept pay cuts and were warned that, if AMR went into bankruptcy, the pay cuts 
would be even greater.141 AMR avoided bankruptcy by renegotiating new collective 
bargaining agreements with its employees, achieving labor cost reductions of about 
$1.6 billion from its union employees and $200 million from its non-union 
employees.142  
 
 The response to AMR’s business plan was overwhelming. Current and former 
employees, both union members and non-union members flooded Judge Lane’s 
mailbox, imploring him to be “fair and equitable,” to consider what the company’s 
employees had already gone through with previous lay offs and cut-backs,143 and, to 
                                            
136 American Airlines to Buy TWA, ABC NEWS (Jan. 8, 2001), https://perma.cc/Z4SV-
PZT2.  
 
137 Edward Wong, American Airlines to Cut Jobs, Plane and Flights, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 14, 2002), https://perma.cc/LV6G-HGQQ.  
 
138 Id. 
 
139 Id. 
 
140 Memorandum in Support of Debtors' Motion to Reject Collective Bargaining 
Agreements. Case 11-15463. Doc. No. 2041, p. 4. 
 
141In Re AMR Corp., 477 B.R. at 401. 
 
142 Memorandum in Support of Debtors' Motion to Reject Collective Bargaining 
Agreements. Case 11-15463. Doc. No. 2041, p. 24.  
 
143 Employee Letter. Case 11-15463. Doc 1068. 
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consider what it would mean for customers’ safety if maintenance workers were 
outsourced.144 Additionally, anticipating negotiations and potential Section 1113 
proceedings, one of the first motions filed after the presentation of the new business 
plan and the announcement regarding reducing the workforce came from the 
Committee of Passenger Service Agents (“PSAs”), which filed a motion to restrain 
AMR from making unilateral changes to the terms and conditions of employment 
contracts of PSAs.145 This motion sought to preemptively prevent AMR from reducing 
the wages, benefits, and working conditions of the PSAs, unless certain criteria were 
met.146 The specific criteria required the National Mediation Board (“NMB”) to certify 
the Communication Workers of America (“CWA”) as the exclusive bargaining 
representative of the PSAs.147 Additionally, if the CWA became certified, AMR must 
meet its obligations under section 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code.148  
 
 At the time this motion was filed CWA had already filed a petition with NMB 
that head yet to be heard. The PSAs anticipated that the NMB would certify the CWA 
by April of 2012 and thus compel AMR to bargain, in good faith, the terms and 
conditions of employment for the PSAs and to uphold its obligations under Section 
1113.149 
 
B. Section 1113 Proceedings 
 1. Section 1113 Requirements 
 Section 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code allows a debtor in possession (“DIP”) to 
reject a collective bargaining agreement if they do so under certain circumstances.150 
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Recognizing the gravity of the reorganization of a company, Section 1113 tries to 
“‘reconcile the public policy that favors collective bargaining with the reality of 
bankruptcy, recognizing that Chapter 11 is not merely business as usual but an 
extremely serious process that can lead to liquidation and the loss of the jobs of all 
the debtor’s employees as well as of the creditors’ opportunity for any meaningful 
recovery.’”151  
 
 Section 1113 provides that, before filing a petition to reject the collective 
bargaining agreements, the debtor in possession must meet several requirements and 
follow certain procedural steps.152 The first procedural step a debtor must take under 
Section 1113 is to “make a proposal to the authorized representative of the employees” 
of the modifications to the agreement. Second, the proposal must be “based on the 
most complete and reliable information available at the time of such proposal.” Third, 
the modifications proposed must be “necessary to permit the reorganization of the 
debtor.” Lastly, the modifications must treat the debtor and all of the affected parties 
“fairly and equitably.” Additionally, during the period of time between making an 
initial proposal to the employees’ representatives and the hearing date set for 
determining the motion to reject, the DIP is required to continue to negotiate in good 
faith with the employees’ representatives, in an attempt to “reach mutually 
satisfactory modifications of such agreement.”153 The DIP bears the burden of proving 
that he or she has complied with all the elements of Section 1113.154 
 
 The proposal made to the representative must be based on complete 
information that is available at the time of the proposal. The circumstances, such as 
the complicated nature of the debtor’s business and the work force, will determine 
the depth of the information, but the burden is on the DIP to gather all the 
information on which the proposal is based, and which it deems reliable. This does 
not include information that contains “hopeful wishes, mere possibilities and 
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speculation.”155 Lastly, the information must be sufficient to be evaluated by the 
employee representatives. 
 
 The modified terms of the proposal must also be necessary for the 
reorganization of the business. However, the Second Circuit has held that “necessary” 
does not mean the bare minimum that is required to keep the company going.156 
Rather, the proposed terms must contain “changes that will enable to debtor to 
complete the reorganization process successfully.”157 The Second Circuit has noted 
that it is impossible to determine if modifications are indeed necessary, without 
looking “into the debtor’s ultimate future and estimating what the debtor needs to 
attain financial health.”158 Further, the proposal as a whole, rather than its 
individual terms, should be considered when determining if the proposal is necessary 
for reorganization.159 
 
 Finally, the proposed modifications must treat all parties fairly and equitably. 
Fair and equitable treatment, however, does not require that all the parties receive 
the same collective bargaining agreements modifications.160 Additionally, courts are 
flexible when determining what constitutes fair and equitable treatment, as there are 
differing levels of sacrifice made by each party.161 Fair and equitable treatment 
simply requires that every affected party shares the “burden of saving the company . 
. . while ensuring that all sacrifice to a similar degree.”162 
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2. AMR’s Specific Proposals 
 At the same time that it unveiled its business plan, AMR presented proposals 
for modifying the collective bargaining agreements that it had with the unions. These 
proposals reflected the business plan’s goal of reducing the company’s labor costs by 
about $1.25 billion, or about 20%, over six years, or by 2017.163 Specifically, the 
proposals asked for $370 million from pilots, $390 million from transport workers and 
$230 million from flight attendants, for a total of $990 million.164  
 
a. Allied Pilots Association 
 AMR’s current collective bargaining agreement with the Allied Pilots 
Association (“the APA”) had been in effect since 2003, and, since 2006, the airline 
company had been in negotiations with the APA concerning labor cost reductions.165 
However, no agreement came of those pre-petition negotiations. In fact, while AMR 
was continually seeking cost reductions, the APA was negotiating for wage and 
pension increases.166 Because of the differing viewpoints in relation to the collective 
bargaining agreements and because the parties were unable to reach agreements, 
AMR filed a section 1113 motion. 
 
 Since February 1, 2012, AMR had been in negotiations with the APA until the 
filing of the Section 1113 motion, resulting in 65 separate negotiating sessions and 
daily communications between the airline company and the union.167 Though these 
negotiations, like the pre-petition negotiations, never resulted in an agreement 
between the parties, AMR admitted that the negotiations were not fruitless. Through 
these negotiations, AMR made fundamental modifications to their proposal to the 
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APA. Specifically, AMR initially proposed to terminate the pilots’ defined benefit 
pension plan. After negotiations, however, AMR proposed to freeze the plans, rather 
than terminate them.168 Thus, AMR reasoned that it had continued to negotiate with 
the APA until the time of the hearing, as required by section 1113. 
 
 AMR’s proposal included many more modifications to the collective bargaining 
agreement. One important proposed modification dealt with codesharing. 
Codesharing is a concept that allows one airline to book passengers’ flights on other 
airlines’ flights. This allows airlines to reach destinations other than those that the 
airline serves directly.169 The collective bargaining agreement that was in effect at 
the time of the negotiations required AMR to meet a certain amount of international 
hours of flying with its own pilots as a pre-condition to codesharing, referred to as the 
“baseline.”170 This baseline was measured by the number of hours that AMR flew 
outside the continental United States. As AMR added more international flights, the 
number of hours that pilots flew outside the United Staes rose, which created a new 
baseline. However, the baseline never decreased. Therefore, if AMR chose to reduce 
its number of international flights for any reason, it would still be required to meet 
the new baseline before codesharing with other airlines. AMR contended that this 
limitation disincentivized the airline company from adding new international flights 
that would increase the baseline, because if, for any reason, the company then 
reduced the number of international flights, it would still have to meet the higher 
baseline before utilizing its codesharing agreements with the other airlines.171    
 
 Another important and highly disputed proposed modification had to 
do with pilot furloughs.172 AMR proposed to furlough about 400 pilots, with the 
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expectation that they would all return to work.173 At the time of negotiations, the 
collective bargaining agreement allowed for “stand in stead” furlough, which allowed 
a pilot to voluntarily take the furlough of another, more junior pilot.174 Pilots are 
generally furloughed based on seniority, so more junior pilots were the first to get 
furloughed. If a pilot, who was planning to retire or take leave, took the furlough of a 
more junior pilot, then AMR argued that they would lose the economic benefit of the 
furlough.175 AMR, effectively, would not have a furloughed pilot in that situation. 
Additionally, the collective bargaining agreement did not permit AMR to furlough 
pilots above a certain seniority level.176 According to AMR, this agreement did not 
give the company the flexibility it needed to respond to catastrophes, nor did it allow 
the company to capitalize on the economic value of the furlough.177  
 
 AMR also sought modifications in the areas of distance learning for pilots, 
which would give AMR the flexibility to train its pilots from virtually any location, 
rather than fly the pilots to Fort Worth, Texas, which was required by the then-
current collective bargaining agreement.178 The company also sought reduction of pay 
guarantees to pilots who were not flying. Under the agreement at the time, pilots 
were guaranteed pay based on either a three-hour day or a five-hour day, even if the 
pilots were not flying.179 For instance, if a pilot had a rest day in between flights, she 
would still be guaranteed five hours of flight pay for the day she did not fly.180 Lastly, 
the company sought to implement pay groups based on equipment types, which would 
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assign aircraft to six different groups and pay employees according to the size and 
seat capacity of the aircraft on which they were working.181 
 
b. Association of Professional Flight Attendants 
 AMR had been in negotiations with the Association of Professional Flight 
Attendants (“the AFPA”) to amend the collective bargaining agreement since 2008.182 
Throughout these negotiations, AMR claimed that the APFA was solely focused on 
recovering the concessions that the flight attendants had made in 2003, which 
included a 26% reduction in labor costs, representing a $340 million deduction.183 The 
APFA claimed that it had “sacrificed enough.”184 Thus, unsurprisingly, due to the 
differing viewpoints on the outcome of the negotiations, the parties failed to come to 
a mutual, pre-petition agreement. 
 
 As with the APA, AMR presented its collective bargaining agreement proposals 
to the AFPA on February 1, 2012. AMR continued to negotiate, as required by section 
1113, with the APFA until March 22, when the union presented a proposal that did 
not meet the competitive needs of AMR. Specifically, the proposal would have 
resulted in flight attendant labor cost reductions that AMR deemed to be “far short” 
of the $230 million that was being sought by the company.185 
 
 AMR sought to amend the collective bargaining agreement it had with the 
APFA in a number of ways. First, AMR proposed changes to flight attendants’ 
compensation.186 At the time of negotiations, flight attendants were paid on an hourly 
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basis, according to every “credit hour” they flew. Under the then-current collective 
bargaining agreement, a “credit hour” included the time spent actually flying, plus 
“credit” time created by a formula set out in the agreement. Credit hours begin when 
a flight attendant signs in, or about one hour before the flight, and credit hours end 
about 15-30 minutes after the final flight at the end of the day.187 AMR did not seek 
to reduce flight attendants’ pay. Rather, the company sought to modify how flight 
attendants were paid, by increasing the number of hours worked, while decreasing 
credit hours that were associated with non-flying hours.188 AMR claimed that this 
payment structure would be similar to its competitors. In addition, AMR sought to 
eliminate incentive pay, which was a per hour premium paid for credit hours worked, 
over 70 per month. AMR argued that eliminating incentive pay was crucial to achieve 
cost reductions.189 In fact, many of AMR’ proposals depended on the elimination of 
incentive pay. Further, AMR wanted eliminate pay for working in certain galley 
positions.190 This galley pay was a per hour premium for working positions that 
nominally involved food and beverage service. AMR argued that this premium was 
paid at a time when food and beverage service was more extensive and burdensome 
on planes, and today that is not the case.191 Lastly, AMR sought to create a single 
base pay rate for international and domestic flights and pay flight attendants for time 
spent at the gate, prior to departure.192 
 
 Second, AMR sought to amend flight attendant work rules. This included 
increasing the maximum number of scheduled hours a flight attendant was required 
to work, increasing the flexibility in flight time scheduling, establishing a preferential 
                                            
 
187 Id. at 13. 
 
188 Id. at 14. 
 
189 Id. at 15. 
 
190 Id. at 17. 
 
191 Id. 
 
192 Id. at 16-17. 
 
46 
 
bidding system for flight schedules, modifying the sick leave policy, and giving the 
company greater discretion regarding staffing.193  
 
 Lastly, AMR sought to make modifications to flight attendants’ benefits plans. 
The company’s proposals would require flight attendants to contribute more to the 
cost of health insurance than the then-current 10% that flight attendants were 
contributing. Additionally, AMR sought to increase the minimum annual paid hours 
needed to qualify to participate in the health insurance plan. Finally, AMR sought to 
“freeze” the retirement plan, which would require AMR to continue to meet the 
obligations of the retirement plan, until the effective date of the freeze, whereby the 
company would incur no new obligations after that date.194 AMR argued that 
“freezing” the plan would save the company about $42 million per year.195 Again, 
AMR contended that these modifications were necessary in order to be competitive 
within the industry. 
 
c. Transport Workers Union 
 The third and final union that AMR had been in negotiations with was the 
Transport Workers Union (“the TWU”), which represented seven different employee 
groups,196 and were each covered by separate collective bargaining agreements.197 
AMR and the TWU had been in negotiations since 2006, renegotiating agreements 
that took effect in 2003.198 Since the beginning of those negotiations, only two of the 
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seven different employee groups represented by TWU, the Ground School and 
Simulator Instructors and the Maintenance Control Technicians, had come to an 
agreement with AMR. However, by filing a section 1113 motion, AMR sought to reject 
those collective bargaining agreement as well.199 
 
 AMR began the post-petition negotiation process with the TWU on February 
1, 2011, and spent hundreds of hours negotiating with the union.200 Though both 
parties put in numerous hours in negotiations, there were no agreements at the time 
of the section 1113 motion.  
 
 One of the most disputed modifications proposed by AMR was increasing the 
ability of the company to outsource various fleet service worker functions.201 AMR 
alleged in its motion that the company was far below the outsourcing level of other 
competitors, which resulted in higher labor costs for the same work. Specifically, 
AMR sought to outsource dayline cabin cleaning services,202 all cargo functions, 
fueling functions, baggage services, and maintenance repair. Additionally, AMR 
sought to increase the station staffing thresholds, which required a certain number 
of TWU-represented employees to staff stations that are currently being staffed by 
TWU-represented employees and the station maintains a certain number of annual 
departures.203 Lastly, AMR wanted to increase the utilization of part-time employees 
and remove surplus employees from the payroll.204 
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 AMR also sought modifications relating to work rules. Specifically, the 
company sought to gain control over determining the required qualifications for 
various job positions.205 The current collective bargaining agreement prohibited AMR 
from making modifications to the Qualifications Administration Manual, which 
effectively gave control to the TWU in determining the required qualifications for 
transit worker employees.206 AMR also wanted to modify the holiday payment 
schedule, which would decrease the number of holidays that employees would receive 
and decrease the rate of pay that employees received for working a holiday.207 Lastly, 
AMR sought to eliminate company pay for time spent on union business.208 Under 
the collective bargaining agreement at the time, AMR paid full wages to union officers 
or representatives who worked full time for the union and did no work for AMR.209 
AMR proposed to eliminate this practice and replace it with a leave of absence from 
the airline that was paid by the TWU.210 
 
 Again, AMR asserted that these modifications were necessary for the 
reorganization of the company and for the company to remain competitive. 
 
3. Unions’ Objections 
 Initially, each of the three unions objected to AMR’ Section 1113 motion to 
reject the collective bargaining agreements. Each objection attacked AMR’ stand-
alone business plan for requiring labor cost reductions before exploring its other 
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options.211 Specifically, each union pointed to a merger with another airline as a 
possible means for reducing costs without sacrificing the employees.212 However, each 
unions’ had its own unique requests and objections to AMR’ proposals and Section 
1113 Motion. 
 
a. Allied Pilots Association’s Objection 
 The APA addressed two key issues in its objection: the specific contract 
modifications made by AMR and a consolidation plan between AMR and US 
Airways.213 The APA argued that the modifications proposed by AMR were “far 
beyond the competitive levels” and that the profitability sought by AMR was 
“unprecedented and unrealistic.”214 The APA argued that it had made concessions 
that would allow AMR to reorganize successfully without “exacting unnecessary, 
punitive concessions from the pilots.”215 Lastly, the APA detailed the counter-
proposals it made and presented to AMR, which equaled $10 million more in savings 
than what was requested by AMR.216 Specifically, this counter-proposal made by the 
APA called for alterations to the pilots’ benefit plans.217 The APA suggested 
increasing the pilots’ contribution to the medical plan to 17%, which would save $24 
million. Additionally, the APA suggested a pension plan “freeze,”218 rather than 
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termination, which would save about $116 million annually. The APA also proposed 
modifications to work rules, including changes to the then-current sick leave policy. 
The APA proposed a sick leave “sellback” program which would allow pilots to sell 
back their unused sick leave to AMR for pay.219  
 
 The APA also rebuked AMR for failing to consider whether a merger or 
consolidation would be a better option than rejecting employees’ collective bargaining 
agreements. The APA, having negotiated a term sheet with US Airways220, contended 
that, the terms agreed upon in negotiations with US Airways proves that AMR’ 
proposals were unnecessary to remain competitive in the market.221 According to the 
motion, if US Airways acquired AMR, it would only cut labor costs by $240 million, 
rather than $370 million.222 In its motion, the APA claimed that AMR’ labor cost 
reduction was based on an earning target that the company could not justify, and was 
thus unnecessary.223 
 
 Lastly, the APA addressed AMR’s proposed modifications regarding code 
sharing. According to the motion, AMR’s proposed modifications would essentially 
give AMR the ability to engage in unrestricted code sharing with other airlines.224 
The APA argued that these modifications were inconsistent among AMR’s 
competitors and were not necessary for effective reorganization.225 
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b. Association of Professional Flight Attendants’ Objection 
 The AFPA criticized AMR for not pursuing a merger. The union pointed out 
that numerous members of management had admitted the need for a merger and that 
the question was one of timing.226 Further, the AFPA attacked AMR for not 
evaluating whether a merger in bankruptcy was a better alternative to the stand-
alone business plan.227 The AFPA argued that the company’s stand-alone business 
plan was essentially a reiteration of its pre-petition business plan.228  
 
 In its objection, the AFPA admitted that it met with US Airways to discuss the 
benefits of a merger. The result of this meeting with US Airways was a term sheet 
that outlined the terms for flight attendants in the event of a merger.229 As a result 
of these negotiations, the AFPA saw reorganization as a possibility through a merger, 
rather than the rejection of collective bargaining agreements.230 
 
 Though a majority of the AFPA’s objection dealt with criticisms of the business 
plan and the failure to consider a merger, the AFPA also contended that the 
modifications that were proposed by AMR would have a negative impact on flight 
attendants’ quality of life and that the proposed contract would put the flight 
attendant labor costs at below market rates.231 In addition to these objections, the 
AFPA also argued that AMR failed to meet the requirements of section 1113. 
Specifically, the APFA argued that the modifications proposed by AMR were not 
necessary for the successful reorganization of the company and that, therefore, the 
proposals were not “fair and equitable.” The APFA argued that, because the proposed 
modifications were not fair and equitable, the APFA had “good cause” to reject the 
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proposals.232  Because of this failure to comply with section 1113 and the deficiencies 
in the business plan, the AFPA argued that AMR’ motion should be denied.233 
 
c. Transport Workers Union’s Objection 
 The TWU objected to AMR’ initial proposal and stated that the modifications 
would “have a devastating effect on TWU-represented employees and their families,” 
by eliminating more than 8,800 TWU-represented employees.234 The TWU argued 
that outsourcing was not a viable solution, as it had been tried by AMR in the past 
and had created issues in the turnaround time for aircraft, creating stagnant 
revenue-generating aircraft.235 The TWU also criticized AMR for using “excessive and 
overreaching cost cutting measures” by proposing to reduce sick leave, vacation days, 
and other benefits.236 Ultimately, the TWU attack AMR for not following the 
procedures set forth in Section 1113,237 for making proposals that were not necessary 
for the reorganization of the company,238 and for ignoring the counter-proposals made 
by the TWU.239 
 
4. AMR’s First Motion 
 After AMR filed its section 1113 motion, it continued to negotiate with the 
three unions.240 The court held a three-week trial, from April 23 to May 25, 2012, in 
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order to make a determination on the motion. The trial resulted in a new collective 
bargaining agreement for the transport worker groups, ratified by the TWU.241 
Additionally, the AFPA submitted a new proposal from AMR to its members for a 
ratification vote.242 Neither of these agreements were filed with or presented to the 
court.243 Lastly, the APA sent a new AMR’s proposal to its members who subsequently 
rejected the proposal.244 AMR and the APA then agreed that it was necessary for the 
court to rule on the motion to reject the APA’s collective bargaining agreement.245  
 
 The court first looked at the necessity requirement under section 1113 by 
addressing the APA’s blanket objection that AMR had failed to consider a merger 
prior to filing a section 1113 motion. The court quickly dismissed this argument. The 
court noted that, ultimately, that there was no merger for the court to consider.246 
Additionally, there is no language in section 1113 that suggests a restraint on when 
a debtor may file a motion under section 1113.247 Thus, AMR was not required to 
consider a merger before it filed a motion to reject the collective bargaining 
agreements. Lastly, the court rejected the APA’s request that it focus on a merger 
between the two parties, because the language of section 1113 is applicable to the 
debtor, not to a third party.248 
 
 Next, the court considered the APA’s objections as to specific proposals made 
by AMR. The court found that the changes relating to benefits for employees would 
fall in line with AMR’ competitors’ benefit plan, and were therefore necessary for 
reorganization.249  The court also considered AMR’ proposed modifications regarding 
its codesharing among other airlines. Though the court acknowledged that changes 
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to AMR’ codesharing would greatly benefit the company, it concluded AMR had not 
shown that the “essentially unlimited” codesharing proposed by AMR was necessary 
for a successful reorganization.250 The court also found that the proposed modification 
to codesharing was beyond the company’s stated goals, and that it had not been 
provided for in the business plan put forth by AMR.251 
 
 In addition to codesharing, the court also took issue with AMR’s proposed 
modification to furloughing pilots. The court noted that, while the business plan only 
proposed the furlough of 400 pilots, the proposal made by AMR sought to eliminate 
all restrictions on the company’s ability to furlough pilots.252 Additionally, the court 
found that the amount of savings gained by the unrestricted ability to furlough pilots 
was unclear. Thus, the court found that the proposed modification to pilots’ furlough 
was unnecessary to the successful reorganization of the business. The court denied 
the motion to reject, but stated that the denial was “without prejudice to remedying 
the two defects identified.”253 
 
5. AMR’s Renewed Motion 
 On August 17, 2012, AMR filed a renewed motion to reject the collective 
bargaining agreement of the APA (“Renewed Motion”).254 This Renewed Motion 
remedied the two defects found by the court in AMR’ first motion, namely the 
modifications to codesharing and furloughing.255 In the Renewed Motion, AMR 
withdrew entirely its prior proposal on furloughs, effectively removing its section 
1113 modifications to the proposal regarding furloughs.256 Additionally, AMR 
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modified its original proposal concerning codesharing. Specifically, the company’s 
proposal would permit codesharing on Alaska Airlines, but prohibit the company from 
codesharing on specific flights to and from Alaska. Additionally, the new proposal 
would eliminate the provision for adding new domestic codesharing relationships.257 
Unlike in the previous proposal, which was denied in large part because of the discord 
between the business plan and codesharing, this proposal closely tied codesharing to 
the existing business plan.  
 
 The APA objected to the Renewed Motion, however, none of the arguments 
made by the APA pertained to the two original defects, codesharing and furloughs.258 
First, the APA argued that AMR’ business plan and the concessions deemed 
necessary for successful reorganization of the company changed materially, from the 
time of the First Motion until the Renewed Motion.259 Specifically, AMR had 
originally determined that a 20% labor cost reduction from all labor groups was 
necessary for the successful reorganization of the company, which included the $370 
million that was requested specifically from the pilots.260 However, during the course 
of the section 1113 negotiations, AMR revised the business plan to require about a 
17% labor cost reduction, representing about $315 million from the pilots alone.261 
Second, the APA argued that AMR’ labor costs were, in fact, in the process of reaching 
uniformity with the rest of the industry, a concept known as “convergence.”262 
Specifically, the APA stated that AMR’ analysis regarding labor costs for pilots and 
the industry standard among the carriers was outdated.263 The APA cited to new 
collective bargaining agreements between Delta and United/Continental and their 
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pilots.264 The APA argued that, when considering the new agreements between these 
airlines and their pilots, AMR’ labor cost disadvantage will shrink from $1 billion to 
$71 million, with the gap closing in the coming years.265 Lastly, the APA argued that 
consolidation prospects had narrowed and the company was likely to merge with US 
Airways.266 The APA asserted that, because US Airways had received a non-
disclosure agreement from AMR, the possibility of a merger was more of an 
inevitability.267 
 
 On September 4, 2012, the court ruled on AMR’ renewed motion to reject the 
collective bargaining agreement that it had with the APA.268 The court quickly 
dismissed the APA’s arguments and stated that the convergence argument was 
“anecdotal and [did] not provide an industry-wide comparison with American’s 
costs.”269 Additionally, the court stated, there was still no merger for the court to 
consider.270 The court dismissed the APA’s first argument and stated that the 17% 
labor cost reduction was a result of negotiations that happened prior to the hearing.271 
In fact, these negotiations were conducted among all three unions and the proposals 
containing these negotiations were ratified by the APFA and the TWU.272 The court 
concluded that these negotiations were barred from being introduced as evidence by 
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the Federal Rules of Evidence Rule 408, prohibiting statements made in the course 
of negotiations from being entered into evidence.273 
 
 As a result of the modifications made by AMR to its new proposal to the APA, 
the court authorized the rejection of the collective bargaining agreement between 
AMR and the APA and overruled the objections made by the APA.274 
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VIII. The Plan 
A. The Initial Plans 
 On April 15, 2013, AMR filed its first Chapter 11 Plan for reorganization (“the 
First Plan”), along with the accompanying disclosure statement, as required by 
section 1125 of the Bankruptcy Code, and motion seeking approval of the disclosure 
statement.275 The First Plan and disclosure statement received multiple objections, 
as well as statements of support. 
 
1. Objections 
 U.S. Bank National Association and U.S. Bank Trust National Association 
(“U.S. Bank”) filed a limited objection to the First Plan and disclosure statement.276 
Specifically, the objection identified “ambiguities or technical problems” in the 
disclosure statement and proposed voting procedures.277 The objection also noted that 
U.S. Bank had notified AMR prior to filing its objection and while U.S. Bank was 
hopeful that the parties could resolve the issue, filed the objection in order to preserve 
its rights.278 
 
 U.S. Bank National Association (“USBNA”) also filed an objection regarding 
AMR’s 9019 Settlement,279 which attempted to resolve certain inter-creditor issues.280 
Though USBNA was not opposed to the settlement, USBNA asserted that the 
disclosure statement did not provide any financial analysis of those inter-creditor 
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issues, nor did it offer sufficient detail on substantive consolidation.281 USBNA 
argued that these limited disclosures would not allow creditors to adequately 
evaluate the terms of the 9019 settlement.282 Thus, USBNA requested that the court 
require AMR to amend the First Plan and disclosure statement. 
 
 USBNA filed an additional objection, in its capacity as indenture trustee with 
respect to Senior Secured Notes, as to the inadequacy of the disclosure statement in 
providing the information necessary to determine the treatment of USBNA’s claim.283 
USBNA contended that the disclosure statement did not specify which class of claims 
the Senior Secured Notes fell into, nor did it detail the treatment the Senior Secured 
Class would receive.284 USBNA requested that the court deny the motion to approve 
the First Plan, unless these modifications took place.285  
 
 Lastly, the U.S. Trustee (“UST”) filed an objection to AMR’ initial motion to 
approve the First Plan and disclosure statement for two reasons: the First Plan did 
not meet the requirements of section 1129(a)(1)286 of the Bankruptcy Code because it 
required impermissible payments to be made for reimbursement of legal expenses to 
certain creditors, as well as to AMR’s CEO, Tom Horton (“Horton”) and the disclosure 
statement did not provide adequate information regarding the First Plan.287 The 
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objection called for more information regarding the 9019 Settlement, substantive 
consolidation, and the approval process that was used to determine the severance 
payment to Horton.288 
 
2. Support 
 AMR filed its response to the multiple objections on May 31, 2013.289 Because 
the majority of the objections were based on the allegation that the disclosure 
statement contained inadequate information, AMR amended the disclosure 
statement in order to address these claims.290 Specifically, AMR intended to file an 
amended disclosure statement and plan that would include additional or amended 
language regarding the “9019 Settlement, substantive consolidation, [and] the 
treatment and classification of certain claims.”291 However, AMR did not come to an 
agreement with certain objectors, namely the UST.292 AMR completely disagreed 
with the UST’s assertion that the First Plan was unconfirmable due to the proposed 
severance payments to Horton and requested that the court overrule these 
objections.293 
 
 The Ad Hoc Committee of Creditors (“the Ad Hoc Committee”) and Hewlett 
Packard Enterprise Services, LLC (“HP”) filed independent statements of support to 
AMR’s motion for approval of the First Plan and disclosure statement.294 The Ad Hoc 
Committee acknowledged that the merger was a strategy that would prove beneficial 
to all the parties involved and that the First Plan should be confirmed to facilitate 
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the merger.295 HP specifically attacked the UST’s argument that the disclosure 
statement did not contained adequate information regarding the reimbursement of 
committee member fees and, therefore, made the First Plan unconfirmable.296 HP 
argued that there was sufficient information in the disclosure statement to render 
the First Plan confirmable, and even if there was not sufficient information, UST’s 
objection was made procedurally too early and should not be heard until the 
confirmation hearing.297 
 
 In addition to statements of support, Bank of New York Mellon (“BNY”) and 
the Unsecured Creditors’ Committee (“OCC”) filed joinders to AMR’ response to the 
objections.298 Specifically, BNY adopted AMR’ response in opposition to the UST’s 
objection and the OCC similarly disagreed with the UST’s objection and argued that 
it was brought prematurely.299 
 
3. Amendments 
 Ultimately, AMR made amendments to the First Plan and disclosure 
statement. Substantively, there was little that was amended to either document. 
However, the amended disclosure statement elaborated on the plan’s compromise on 
intercompany claims, which was the 9019 Settlement.300 These claims arose from 
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intercompany payables and receivables made in connection with the operation of the 
business that arose prior to the filing of the voluntary petition and that were owed by 
AMR to one of its affiliates. The amended disclosure statement articulated that the 
amended plan and its distribution scheme incorporated the 9019 Settlement, or 
compromise, as to these intercompany claims, in order to avoid future litigation.301 
The disclosure statement specifically stated “the 9019 Settlement resolves extremely 
complex factual and legal issues, greatly facilitates the resolution of these cases, 
avoids significant litigation costs, and expedites confirmation and consummation of 
a plan of reorganization.”302 
 
 The amended disclosure statement also provided a brief statement as to the 
approval of the Horton’s severance pay.303 The statement said that AMR’ Board of 
Directors approved the severance payments and that consideration was given to 
Horton’s ongoing service to the merged company in determining the severance 
payment.304 
 
 Lastly, the only major substantive change made to the First Plan was the 
addition of the section entitled Special Provisions for Governmental Units.305 This 
new provision stated that, upon confirmation of the plan, nothing in the plan would 
“discharge, release, enjoin, or otherwise bar” any liability of AMR with respect to 
“governmental units.”306 
 
 A hearing on the motion to approve the amended disclosure statement was 
conducted on June 4, 2013.307 Prior to the hearing, AMR had come to an agreement 
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regarding almost all of the objections.308 AMR filed a second amended plan and second 
amended disclosure statement that reflected these agreements.309 The only objection 
that AMR did not resolve before the hearing was the UST’s objection.310 The UST’s 
objection consisted of two issues; that the disclosure statement did not contain 
adequate information regarding the severance payment for Horton and that the First 
Plan was unconfirmable because it violated section 503(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy 
Code311 because it provided for the severance payment to Horton.312 AMR, the 
creditors committee, and HP argued that this violation, even if it was a violation, did 
not render the plan “patently unconfirmable,”313 and therefore the objection should 
not be heard until the plan confirmation hearing.314 The court overruled the UST’s 
objections, and held that the disclosure statement contained adequate information 
regarding the severance payment and that the UST failed to show that the plan was 
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patently unconfirmable.315 The court approved the amended disclosure statement 
and approved the solicitation packages and procedures for distributing the disclosure 
statement. The confirmation hearing was set for August 15, 2013. 
 
B. The Confirmation Hearing 
 On August 15, 2013, the court held a hearing to confirm (“the Hearing”) the 
second amended plan.316 However, just two days before the Hearing, the Department 
of Justice filed a lawsuit that sought to block the merger on antitrust grounds.317 
Though the judge was hesitant to conduct the Hearing in light of the pending 
antitrust lawsuit, he continued with the Hearing and requested briefs from all parties 
outlining the reasons why he should proceed with confirmation.318  
 
 At the Hearing, AMR urged the court to confirm the plan and presented 
evidence of the acceptance of the plan by the classes.319 According to the evidence 
presented, the plan was accepted by an “overwhelming majorit[y]” in each class.320 
More than 99% in each class, in terms of number as well as amount, voted to confirm 
the plan.321 The charts below outline how the classes voted regarding the plan for 
reorganization: 
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 AMR also presented its third amended plan at the Hearing, which accounted 
for some technical amendments.323 None of the amendments affected the treatment 
of or the amount to be distributed to the various classes of claims.324 AMR clarified 
that these amendments were not material and therefore did not require another 
solicitation of votes, nor would these amendments allow those who had voted to 
change their votes.325 
 
1. Objections 
 There were a number of objections filed prior to the Hearing, though most of 
these objections were resolved prior to the Hearing.326 However, the court heard oral 
arguments concerning the few objections that were unresolved. 
 
 The first objection was made by the State of Michigan.327 This objection 
objected to the plan on the basis that, to the extent it seeks to limit collection of tax 
debt due from those other than AMR, it was unconfirmable.328 AMR argued that the 
plan did not attempt to limit the collection of tax debts due.329 The court overruled 
this objection.330 
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 The second and third objections were addressed together.331 These objections 
were made by Supplement B Pilot Beneficiaries and the Former TWA Pilots.332 Each 
objection asked the court to delay the confirmation Hearing, until the resolution of a 
pending appeal.333 The primary appeal, of which both objectors were parties, dealt 
with an order from the court, authorizing AMR to enter into new collective bargaining 
agreements with the APA.334 The court overruled these objections, and noted that the 
pendency of the appeals had little bearing on the confirmation of the plan.335 
 
 The fourth group of objections were made by pro se litigants.336 These litigants 
objected to the confirmation based on the modification of retiree benefits, the 
severance payment to Horton, and venue.337 AMR argued that the plan did not modify 
any retiree benefits under section 1114 of the Bankruptcy Code.338 AMR also 
proposed that the issue of the severance payment to Horton be addressed in 
connection with the UST’s objection.339 Lastly, AMR argued that raising the issue of 
venue was irrelevant and that there was no issue with the venue of the case.340 Thus, 
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with the exception of the issue of severance payment to Horton, the court overruled 
the objections made by the pro se litigants.341 
 
 The fifth objection addressed was made by a group of plaintiffs called the 
Clayton Plaintiffs.342 This group of plaintiffs were neither creditors, nor 
shareholders.343 The Clayton Plaintiffs sought to delay the confirmation of the plan 
in order to litigate an action that was filed in California against AMR.344 This action 
was an independent antitrust lawsuit that alleged that the AMR and U.S. Airways 
merger was a violation of the Clayton Antitrust Act.345 The Clayton Plaintiffs were 
primarily concerned that the confirmation of the plan would bar their independent 
claim regarding the merger, because the plan contained specific provisions that 
stated that upon confirmation, the plan would release and discharge AMR from all 
claims held against the company.346 Essentially, the Clayton Plaintiffs wanted to halt 
the confirmation of the plan so that the potential confirmed plan would not bar their 
claim as to the legality of the merger. In response to the Clayton Plaintiffs’ objection, 
AMR, US Airways, and the UCC argued that the plan and the merger were 
contingent upon one another and that the Clayton Plaintiffs’ argument was, 
therefore, without merit. Additionally, AMR offered to “carve out” the provisions in 
the plan that barred claims upon confirmation, specifically with respect to the 
Clayton Plaintiffs.347 The Clayton Plaintiffs ultimately agreed to AMR’s offer.348  
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 The last objection that was heard was by the UST.349 This objection focused 
primarily on the severance payments made to Horton and the award of 
administrative expenses to committee members and indenture trustees. The UST 
argued that the severance payments violated section section 503(c)(2) of the 
Bankruptcy Code.350 AMR rebutted the first objection by stating that the severance 
payments were not governed by section 503(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code;351 rather, 
the severance payments were governed by section 1129(a)(4),352 because AMR 
requested that the severance payments be approved in the context and under the 
protection of the plan.353 Additionally, the UST objected to the automatic payment of 
professional fees and expenses to the indenture trustees354 and to the members of the 
Creditors’ Committee, and argued that these payments violated section 503(b) of the 
Bankruptcy Code.355 Specifically, the UST argued that they violated sections 
503(b)(3) and (5)356 and that the contributions made by the indenture trustee and the 
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Creditors’ Committee were neither necessary, nor substantial and thus should not be 
paid automatically.357 AMR, the Creditors’ Committee, and several representatives 
for indenture trustees,358 in defense of the plan, claimed that those administrative 
expenses were reasonable and, thus, the UST’s objection should be overruled. The 
court reserved its ruling on these objections. 
 
 About two weeks later, on August 29, 2013, the court held a second hearing 
(“the Second Confirmation Hearing”) on the confirmation of the plan, specifically as 
it related to the Department of Justice lawsuit.359 At the time of the Second 
Confirmation Hearing, no creditor, shareholder, or economic party in interest had 
filed any oppositions to the confirmation of the plan, with respect to the antitrust 
suit.360 The only opposition to the confirmation of the plan was by the Clayton 
Plaintiffs.361 The court ultimately overruled the Clayton Plaintiffs’ objection. 
 
 At the Second Confirmation Hearing, AMR argued for the confirmation of the 
plan. They argued that the plan was feasible and that, if the plan became effective 
and the merger closed there would be no need for future liquidation or financial 
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reorganization, satisfying the feasibility requirement of section 1129(a)(12).362 At the 
end of the Second Confirmation Hearing, the court found the arguments in favor of 
confirmation persuasive, but there was no ruling as to the confirmation of the plan.363 
 
 On September 12, 2013, the parties held their final status conference and on 
September 13, the judge entered his order.364 The court denied the objection of the 
UST based on the payment of administrative expenses of certain creditors committee 
members.365 The court reasoned that the professional fees were permissible under 
sections 1129(4) and 1123(b)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code.366 The court upheld the 
UST’s objection as to Mr. Horton’s severance payments.367 The court reasoned that 
the severance payment did not meet the reasonableness standard of section 
1129(a)(4).368  
 
 Ultimately, the court approved the payment of professional fees (but denied 
the severance payment to Mr. Horton).369 The court decided to continue with the 
confirmation of the plan, spite of the pending antitrust suit.370 The court confirmed 
the plan, except to the extent that it contained any provision relating to Horton’s 
severance payment.371 
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C. The Final Plan 
 On October 21, 2013, the court filed its findings of fact and conclusions of law 
regarding AMR’s Fourth Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan for reorganization (“the 
Plan”), which reflected the severance payment modifications ordered by the court in 
its confirmation order on September 13.372 The Plan stipulated 19 different classes of 
claims and outlined the treatment what each class would receive on the effective 
date.373 The 19 different classes were divided according to whether they were 
impaired or unimpaired, as expressed by the following chart:374 
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 A class is impaired if the plan “modifies the rights that the class of creditors 
would otherwise have.”375 The class is unimpaired if the plan does not modify the 
class’s rights, or maintains the same rights that it had upon entering the plan. An 
unimpaired class is deemed to have accepted the plan, as it maintains the same 
position it had prior to the plan. Thus, the difference between an impaired class and 
an unimpaired class is important, as the impaired classes largely determine the 
outcome of the plan.  
 
1. Administrative Expenses and Priority Tax Claims 
 The first treatment of claims addressed in the Plan was the Administrative 
Expenses and Priority Tax Claims.376 Administrative Expenses were any expenses of 
the administration of the Chapter 11 Cases “arising on or prior to the Effective 
Date.”377 Priority Tax Claims were any claims of “a governmental unit of the kind 
entitled to priority in payment as specified in . . . the Bankruptcy Code.”378 Under the 
Plan, these claims were to receive payment in full satisfaction of the amount of the 
Administrative Expense or the tax claim.379 Ultimately, these expenses totaled more 
than $290 million.380 
 
2. Secured Claims 
 The next class of claims articulated in the Plan consisted of AMR Secured 
Claims, American Secured Aircraft Claims, American Other Secured Claims, and 
Eagle Secured Claims. Each of these claim holders were to be fully paid for their 
claims against either AMR, AMR, or Eagle.381 The claim holder was to be paid in one 
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of five ways, at the option of AMR. First, the claim holder could be paid in cash, equal 
to the unpaid amount of the secured claim.382 Second, claim holder could be paid the 
proceeds of the sale of the collateral that secured the claim.383 Third, the creditor 
could be paid in the collateral that secured the claim.384 Fourth, the creditor might 
receive any other treatment that did not alter the “legal, equitable, and contractual 
rights” that the credit holder possessed.385 Finally, the claimant could be paid in any 
other way that satisfied section 1124 of the Bankruptcy Code.386 The method of 
payment was to determined by either the AMR debtor, the AMR debtor, or the Eagle 
debtor, depending on who the claim was against.387 
 
3. Priority Non-Tax Claims 
 The priority non-tax claim class consisted of all those claims that were not a 
part of the Administrative Expenses or Priority Tax Claims that were entitled to 
priority payment, according to section 507(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.388 These claims 
holders were to receive cash “in full satisfaction” of their claims against either AMR, 
AMR, or Eagle.389 
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4. General Unsecured Guaranteed Claims 
 The next class of claims for which the Plan set forth treatment was AMR 
General Unsecured Guaranteed Claims and American General Unsecured 
Guaranteed Claims. These claim holders were entitled to receive a number of shares 
of preferred stock in the new company, that was equal to the amount of the “Double-
Dip Full Recovery Amount,”390 divided by $25 per share.391 Additionally, the AMR 
Note Claims392 were to be allowed as AMR General Unsecured Guaranteed Claims, 
and those claims were to receive the prepetition amount of each indenture, plus 
interest. The Plan also provided that at any time before the fifth business day before 
the Plan became effective, the holders of AMR General Unsecured Guaranteed 
Claims and American General Unsecured Guaranteed Claims could have their claims 
treated as Other General Unsecured Claims.393 Further, the claim holders of “Triple-
Dip Unsecured Claims”394 were also treated as General Unsecured Guaranteed 
Claims.395 
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interest. 
 
391 Id. at 47. This calculation was based on the “Double-Dip Full Recovery Amount,” 
divided by per share “Initial Stated Value.” The Initial Stated Value was $25 per 
share. (The Plan at 22). 
 
392 These AMR Claims were claims against American Airlines arising under any 
“indenture.” “The term ‘indenture’ means mortgage, deed of trust, or indenture, 
under which there is outstanding a security . . . constituting a claim against the 
debtor, a claim secured by a lien on any of the debtor’s property, or an equity 
security of the debtor.” 11. U.S.C. § 101(28). 
 
393 Debtors’ Fourth Amended Plan. Doc. No. 10367-1, p. 48. 
 
394 Id. “Triple-Dip Unsecured Claims” were General Unsecured Claims based on the 
obligations of American to guarantee guaranteed obligations of AMR. 
 
395 Id. at 51. 
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5. Other General Unsecured Claims 
 AMR Other General Unsecured Claims, American Other General Unsecured 
Claims, and Eagle General Unsecured Claims were all subject to the same treatment 
under the Plan. Claim holders in this class would receive shares of New Mandatorily 
Convertible Preferred Stock396 on the Effective Date397, or as soon as reasonably 
practicable.398 Claim holders would also receive shares of New Common Stock after 
the Final Mandatory Conversion Date.399 The shares received by this class of claims 
were received subsequent to the shares received by the General Unsecured 
Guaranteed Claims.400 
 
6. Union Claims 
 AMR’ unions401 received shares of New Common Stock, according to the 
renegotiated collective bargaining agreements under section 1113. The APA was 
entitled to receive a 13.5% stake in the merged company. The APFA and the TWU 
were entitled to receive a 3% and a 4.8% stake, respectively.402 Additionally, the Plan 
granted distributions to non-union employees, constituting a 2.3% equity stake in the 
company, to be distributed by the merged company.403 
 
                                            
396 Id. “New Mandatorily Convertible Preferred Stock” was a series of preferred 
stock of the new, merged company. 
 
397 Id. Effective Date is a date, either on the day the Plan is confirmed or a business 
day after confirmation, when the obligations under the Plan must be fulfilled. 
 
398 Id. at 52. 
 
399 Id. “Final Mandatory Conversion Date” was 120 days after the effective date. 
 
400 Id. This is also known as the Double-Dip Recovery. 
 
401 Id. The unions included the APA, AFPA, and the TWU. 
 
402 Id. at 53-54. 
 
403 Id. at 65. 
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7. Convenience Class Claims 
 The next class of claims articulated in the Plan was the Convenience Class 
Claims,404 which included American Convenience Class Claims and Eagle 
Convenience Class Claims. Claim holders under this class were entitled to receive 
cash equal to 100% of the amount of the claim.405 However, if the aggregate amount 
of the American Convenience Class Claims and the Eagle Convenience Class Claims 
exceeded $25 million, that percentage amount would be reduced so that the aggregate 
amount was less than $25 million.406 
 
8. Equity Interests 
 The Plan also specified treatment for AMR Equity Interests. Under the Plan, 
the interest holders were to receive a certain amount of New Common Stock on the 
Effective Date and receive share of New Common Stock at intervals of 30 days, 60 
days, 90 days, and 120 days after the Effective Date.407  
 
9. Other Equity Interests 
 The last class articulated in the Plan was Other Equity Interests, which 
included AMR Other Equity Interests, American Equity Interests, and Eagle Equity 
Interests. Equity Interests were defined as interests of equity security in AMR, as 
represented by any issued and outstanding shares of common or preferred stock, or 
any other device that showed an ownership in the company.408 Under this provision 
of the Plan, equity holders’ interest in the company would not be cancelled as a result 
of the dissolution or winding-up of the company, if such dissolution or winding-up 
ever took place.409 
                                            
404 Id. A convenience class claim was any claim against AMR that would otherwise 
be a General Unsecured Claim and that is more than $0 but less than $10,000.  
 
405 Id. at 54. 
 
406 Id. at 54-56. 
 
407 Id. at 49. 
 
408 Id. at 18. 
 
409 Id. at 30, 55. 
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D. The Merger Agreement and The Plan 
 As well as providing for the treatment of the different classes, the Plan also 
laid out the means by which the Plan was to be implemented in conjunction with the 
merger agreement. The Plan and the merger agreement were contingent upon one 
another.410 The Plan specified that the new company’s corporate governance 
documents must be “full force and effect”411 as a condition precedent to the 
effectiveness of the Plan.412 Additionally, all conditions precedent to the completion 
of the merger were required to be satisfied and the Effective Date and merger closing 
were to occur at the same time.413 Further, the Plan subjected itself to the terms of 
the merger agreement, in the event of any conflict between the two.414 
 
E. Additional Provisions of the Plan 
 In addition to the treatment of the different classes and the implementation, 
the Plan also contained other articles governing the reorganization of AMR.  
 
 The Plan set out the means by which it would be implemented and executed, a 
few sections of which are worth noting. First, each debtor would continue its corporate 
existence after the effective date and subject to the merger agreement.415 Second, this 
section of the Plan constituted a 9019 Settlement, which reflected a compromise of 
intercreditor issues416 relating to the benefits and rights of those creditors. 
Confirmation of the Plan constituted approval of the 9019 Settlement motion.417 
                                            
410 Debtors’ Final Disclosure Statement. Doc. No. 8591, p. 4. 
 
411 Debtors’ Fourth Amended Plan. Doc. No. 10367-1, p. 90. 
 
412 Id. 
 
413 Id. 
 
414 Id. at 65. 
 
415 Id at 64. 
 
416 Id. at 65. 
 
417 Id. 
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Further, this section provided for the distribution of equity shares to the non-union 
employees.418 Under this article, the Plan also called for substantive consolidation of 
AMR, AMR, and Eagle.419 Again, the Plan served as a motion seeking approval of 
consolidation and confirmation of the Plan would signal the approval of the motion to 
consolidate.420 However, if the court denied the motion to consolidate, AMR was 
entitled to withdraw the Plan entirely.421 
 
 The means for implementation article also included a “cramdown”422 provision, 
which allowed AMR to seek confirmation of the Plan under § 1129(b) of the 
Bankruptcy Code, in the event that the Plan was not accepted by the required number 
of votes.423 Lastly, this article appointed a new initial Board of Directors for the new 
company.424 The new board consisted of 12 members, including Horton and Doug 
Parker, the former CEO of US Airways.425 After selection of the initial board, the 
shareholders were required to elect members in accordance with the new company’s 
corporate governance documents.426 
 
                                            
 
418 Id. 
 
419 Id. at 66. 
 
420 Id. 
 
421 Id. at 68. 
 
422 “Cramdown” is a bankruptcy term that is codified in § 1129(b), permitting a 
court to confirm a plan, absent a consensual vote by one or more impaired classes of 
claims. BERNSTEIN & KUNEY, BANKRUPTCY IN PRACTICE (5TH ED.) 515, 522.  
 
423 Debtors’ Fourth Amended Plan. Doc. No. 10367-1, p. 69. 
 
424 Id. at 73. 
 
425 Id. 
 
426 Id. 
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 Another article provided for procedures for disputed claims.427 These 
procedures allowed AMR to object to any filed claims and to refrain from payment on 
a disputed claim until that claim became an Allowed Claim.428 
 
 The Executory Contracts and Unexpired Leases article stated that all 
executory contracts and unexpired leases of AMR would be deemed rejected on the 
Effective Date.429 However, this article would not apply to any executory contracts or 
unexpired leases that had been previously assumed or rejected or that were the 
subjects of separate motions to assume or reject that were still pending on the day 
the Plan was confirmed, or those to which a Treatment Objection was filed.430 Other, 
enumerated contracts were not to be deemed rejected upon the Effective Date; these 
included, Cash Management Agreements, Confidentiality and Non-Disclosure 
Agreements, Fuel Consortia Agreements, Insurance Plans, Workers’ Compensation 
Plans, and Collective Bargaining Agreements.431 Agreements that were specifically 
assumed as of the Effective Date included employee benefit plans, postpetition 
aircraft agreements, and any employee protection arrangements.432 Lastly, pension 
plan required contributions were assumed as of the Effective Date and AMR agreed 
to continue pension plan payments after the Effective Date.433 
 
 The Effect of Confirmation article stipulated that on the Effective Date, all 
property of AMR would vest in the new company free and clear of all claims, liens, 
encumbrances, charges, and interests, except as to those provided for in the Plan.434 
                                            
427 Id. at 75. 
 
428 Id. at 76.  
 
429 Id. at 79. 
 
430 Id.  
 
431 Id. at 82-83. 
 
432 Id. at 84-85. 
 
433 Id. at 85-86. 
 
434 Id. at 91. 
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Additionally, in light of the distributions made according to the Plan, this article 
considered the holder of each claim and interest to have waived, release, and 
discharged AMR to the fullest extent, according to section 1141 of the Bankruptcy 
Code.435 Upon the Effective Date, AMR released all the directors of AMR, all those 
who were advisors after the commencement date,436 and all committees, trustees, 
agents, and other professionals from any causes of action held by AMR, relating to 
the bankruptcy.437 
 
 The Plan also provided that the Bankruptcy Court retained jurisdiction 
relating to any and all matters arising under or out of, or related to the bankruptcy.438 
 
 Finally, the Plan contained miscellaneous provisions that dissolved the 
committees after the Effective Date, that allowed AMR to modify or amend the Plan 
according to section 1127 of the Bankruptcy Code,439 and that allowed AMR to revoke, 
withdraw, or delay the Plan before it was confirmed and to file subsequent amended 
plans of reorganization.440 
 
 The Plan’s Effective Date was December 9, 2013.441 
 
  
                                            
435 Id. at 91. See also 11 U.S.C. § 1141, which outlines the effect of confirmation. 
 
436 The commencement date is the day the voluntary petition was filed, which was 
November 29, 2011. 
 
437 Id. at 93-94. 
 
438 Id. at 95. 
 
439 “The proponent of a plan may modify such plan at any time before confirmation.” 
11 U.S.C. § 1127(a). 
 
440 Id. at 98. 
 
441 Notice of Entry of Order Confirming Debtors’ Plan. Doc. No. 11402. 
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IX. The Merger 
 During the same period that the debtors worked through the § 1113 process of 
restructuring its collective bargaining agreements, indications that AMR would 
merge with US Airways began to materialize. From the beginning of the 
restructuring process, the court and all interested parties recognized that AMR 
lacked two advantages its competitors possessed: lower labor costs through 
renegotiated collective bargaining agreements and the increased market share that 
came from its competitors’ mergers. While AMR’s board, the OCC, and the Ad Hoc 
Committee constructed their bankruptcy exit strategy around a standalone company 
moving forward,442 each party recognized the myriad advantages to a merger under 
the right terms. Throughout AMR’s bankruptcy, newspapers circulated speculation 
that US Airways was interested in a merger with AMR. By the time the § 1113 
proceedings began shaping up, that speculation began to solidify into negotiation. 
  
At the same time, the parties were confident that pragmatism would prevail 
in the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division under the Obama Administration. 
Both AMR and US Airways had been burned by the Justice Department’s handling 
of antitrust issues in previous administrations but also took stock of the recent 
mergers of Delta and United, its two largest competitors—both of which were 
approved at the time by the Justice Department.443 Just before Judge Lane was set 
to approve the merger as part of the AMR reorganization, however, the Justice 
Department sought an injunction of the merger in a D.C. federal district court on 
Clayton Antitrust Act grounds. At that point, it appears that sufficient uncertainty 
persisted that the strategy of the key players --- the Debtor, the Ad Hoc Committee, 
the OCC, and the labor unions -- turned from one of adversarial combat into one of 
solidarity.  That is, they recognized “we’re all in this together.”  
 
                                            
442 Motion of Debtors for Entry of Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105(a), 363(b), and 
503(b) Authorizing and Approving (i) Merger Agreement Among AMR Corporation, 
AMR Merger Sub, Inc., and US Airways Group, Inc., (ii) Debtors’ Execution of and 
Performance Under Merger Agreement, (iii) Certain Employee Compensation and 
Benefit Arrangements, (iv) Termination Fees, and (v) Related Relief. Case 11-
15463. Doc. No. 6800, p. 6. 
 
443 See Section III supra on the 2001 American Airlines-Trans World Airlines 
merger issues that sprung from the failed merger of United-US Airways. 
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This section breaks down the merger into three sections. First, we examine the 
negotiations between AMR, US Airways, and the labor unions. Second, we turn to the 
antitrust objections that arose from the proposed merger. Finally, we examine the 
contours of the deal that emerged. 
 
A. Negotiations 
 Although the prospect of merging with AMR was never unattractive, many 
analysts believed that AMR would be able to remain independent because it went 
into bankruptcy with over four billion dollars in unrestricted cash, thus allowing for 
greater independence than it would have if subject to restrictive covenants that would 
have been contained in a typical DIP financing arrangement.444 However, the OCC, 
the labor unions, and the Ad Hoc Committee of AMR’s bondholders quickly filled any 
void left by the absence of a DIP lender.445 Tom Horton on several occasions expressed 
skepticism about any possibility of a merger while AMR was in bankruptcy.446 As 
Horton and the AMR team saw it, “American [Airlines] had two primary goals: to run 
a great airline and to get out of bankruptcy as soon as possible.”447 If the merger 
                                            
444 Andrew B. Dawson, Labor Activism in Bankruptcy, 89 AM. BANKR. L.J. 97, 118 
(2015). 
 
445 Mike Spector & Matt Wirz, ‘Distressed’ Investors Circle AMR, WALL STREET 
JOURNAL (Oct. 12, 2012), https://perma.cc/ZYJ7-NMUT; Mike Spector & Susan 
Carey, Attorney Was AMR Deal Key, WALL STREET JOURNAL (Feb. 7, 2013), 
https://perma.cc/NG42-AX3Q. See also Statement of the Official Committee of 
Unsecured Creditors’ Regarding Matters to Be Heard on December 22, 2011. Case 
11-15463. Doc. No. 403, p. 4 (“The Committee's oversight responsibilities are 
highlighted and particularly essential in these cases where the absence of debtor-in-
possession financing also means that the operating covenants, milestones, and other 
limitations normally imposed on debtors are also absent.”). AMR’s chief counsel, 
Harvey Miller, took umbrage with such an activist position, declaring in a 
subsequent hearing that the entire OCC statement was “inflammatory.” Transcript 
of Hearing on Dec. 22, 2011. Doc. No. 465, p. 39-40. 
 
446 Mike Spector & Susan Carey, Attorney Was AMR Deal Key, WALL STREET 
JOURNAL (Feb. 7, 2013), https://perma.cc/NG42-AX3Q. 
 
447 Susan Carey, US Airways Chief Describes Biggest Challenges in AMR 
Settlement, WALL STREET JOURNAL (Dec. 1, 2013), https://perma.cc/6DXG-2L5P.  
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helped them get out of bankruptcy quicker, that would be great, but only so long as 
it allowed them to continue running a great airline. Prior to and early on in the 
bankruptcy process, AMR had evaluated possible mergers and believed that no good 
deal could develop until AMR emerged from its vulnerable position.448 Moreover, the 
Ad Hoc Committee members actively supported AMR exiting bankruptcy as a 
standalone entity—even going so far as to offer to finance its exit, albeit on the 
condition that AMR would need to appoint an entirely new board of directors.449 That 
stipulation prevented AMR from seriously pursuing the offer. 
 
 At the same time, three other players in this group (i.e., US Airways, the labor 
unions, and the OCC) actively worked against a standalone exit. From the time AMR 
entered bankruptcy protection, US Airways made every effort to convince AMR to 
consider a merger with its airline. On its own, however, US Air was unsuccessful in 
convincing AMR’s executive team to discuss terms because AMR wanted to wait until 
it exited bankruptcy so it could negotiate from a position of strength.450  
 
Perhaps more than any other entity or individual, Jack Butler, the lead 
attorney representing the OCC, “was instrumental in getting AMR to the negotiating 
table with US Airways.”451 Butler cajoled the AMR team while also persuading both 
American and US Airways’ unions to see the merger as an ideal match. In addition 
to their role representing over three quarters of AMR’s workforce, the unions also 
belonged to the OCC (along with other bondholders and suppliers) because they had 
a large stake in AMR’s debt. As a result, Butler saw the value in maximizing the 
                                            
 
448 Mike Spector & Susan Carey, Attorney Was AMR Deal Key, WALL STREET 
JOURNAL (Feb. 7, 2013), https://perma.cc/NG42-AX3Q. 
 
449 Terry Maxon, APA: We’ve Got A Commitment For A New Independent AMR 
Board of Directors, DALLAS MORNING NEWS (Nov. 2012), https://perma.cc/RY7S-
NBJ7. 
 
450 Mike Spector & Susan Carey, Attorney Was AMR Deal Key, WALL STREET 
JOURNAL (Feb. 7, 2013), https://perma.cc/NG42-AX3Q (“Horton said he was always 
open to exploring mergers once American finished redoing labor contracts and took 
other restructuring measures.”). 
 
451 Id. 
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unions’ leverage over AMR and the possible merger. At the same time that he 
appeared to be working with the unions to put together the best merger deal possible, 
he was also pressuring AMR’s team to present a “robust standalone restructuring 
plan that creditors could weigh against a merger so each plan would compete to offer 
creditors the best deal.”452 
 
 The Allied Pilots Association (“APA”) attacked the standalone plan using a 
three-prong approach.453  First, the APA reached an agreement with US Airways, 
confirmed in a memorandum of understanding (“MOU”) that created a framework for 
labor conditions necessary for the unions to approve of the merger. This agreement 
served two functions: it publicly signaled to other interested parties the pilot unions’ 
approval of a merger; and “it provided a means for other creditors to assess the 
viability and value of such a merger.”454 
 
 Second, the APA worked with other creditors to form a bloc of support for the 
merger with US Air. After rejecting a “new contract offer containing meager pay 
raises, higher health-care costs and more time in the cockpit—despite a promise for 
a 13.5% ownership stake in a reorganized airline”—the union agreed to new collective 
bargaining agreements at the insistence of Butler, who warned, “there wouldn’t be a 
third bite at the apple.”455 These new agreements further “allow[ed] other creditors 
to compare the standalone versus merger plans.”456 Because the Ad Hoc Committee 
remained interested in determining AMR’s board makeup, it circulated a letter to the 
APA affirming that it would only support a standalone plan on the basis that such a 
                                            
452 Id. 
 
453 Andrew B. Dawson, Labor Activism in Bankruptcy, 89 AM. BANKR. L.J. 97, 119-
20 (2015). 
 
454 Id. at 119. 
 
455 Mike Spector & Susan Carey, Attorney Was AMR Deal Key, WALL STREET 
JOURNAL (Feb. 7, 2013), https://perma.cc/NG42-AX3Q. See also Andrew B. Dawson, 
Labor Activism in Bankruptcy, 89 AM. BANKR. L.J. 97, 120 (2015). 
 
456 Dawson, Labor Activism, at 120. 
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plan would provide for an entirely new board.457 Consequently, this action appears to 
have made a merger more enticing to AMR’s leadership. 
 
 Lastly, the APA “engaged in more ‘classic’ resistance to AMR’s reorganization 
plan.”458 The union opposed the motion to reject the collective bargaining 
agreements.459 They also conducted a strike vote—despite its futility since the 
bankruptcy court possessed the ability to enjoin such a strike once the court rejected 
the collective bargaining agreements.460 Additionally, some have suggested the APA 
engaged in a work slowdown—another classic labor strategy—by employing a tactic 
known as “work-to-rule,” where pilots report maintenance issues that, though 
technically are required to be accounted for, are not normally reported.461 
 
 While AMR’s team remained agnostic about merging with US Airways, in late 
August 2012 they began six months of heated negotiations and produced a deal 
supported by everyone involved. Due to the unanimous support, the merger became 
the centerpiece of AMR’s bankruptcy exit strategy—and thus promised a quick exit 
from Chapter 11. The basic outline created a merged entity operating under AMR’ 
name and headquartered in AMR’s current location (Fort Worth, Texas).462  The 
                                            
457 Terry Maxon, APA: We’ve Got A Commitment For A New Independent AMR 
Board of Directors, DALLAS MORNING NEWS (Nov. 2012), https://perma.cc/RY7S-
NBJ7. 
 
458 Dawson, Labor Activism, at 120. 
 
459 See Section VII supra on the collective bargaining agreements negotiation 
process. 
 
460 Andrew B. Dawson, Labor Activism in Bankruptcy, 89 AM. BANKR. L.J. 97, 119-
20 (2015). 
 
461 Id. 
 
462 Motion of Debtors for Entry of Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105(a), 363(b), and 
503(b) Authorizing and Approving (i) Merger Agreement Among AMR Corporation, 
AMR Merger Sub, Inc., and US Airways Group, Inc., (ii) Debtors’ Execution of and 
Performance Under Merger Agreement, (iii) Certain Employee Compensation and 
Benefit Arrangements, (iv) Termination Fees, and (v) Related Relief. Case 11-
15463. Doc. No. 6800, p. 21. 
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board would include both Horton and Parker, along with five other board members 
from US Airways and AMR, and five other directors appointed by a search 
committee.463 The search committee would be composed of eight members, four 
designated by the OCC and four designated by the Ad Hoc Committee.464 
Consequently, critical staff immediately began leaving US Airways’ headquarters in 
Tempe, Arizona, and moving into AMR offices in order to begin facilitating the merger 
over the next six months. By August, court and regulatory approval of the merger 
(and with it, the plan) was all that remained; different parties began filing with the 
court their respective statements in support of the merger.465 No one among both 
company’s advisors believed that the court or any regulatory agency would object to 
the deal.466 
 
B. Antitrust Issues 
 On August 13, 2013—days before the court was set to approve the merger—
attorneys from the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department filed a lawsuit in the 
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.467 The lawsuit sought to enjoin the 
merger based on antitrust concerns under § 7 of the Clayton Antitrust Act.468 The 
                                            
 
463 Id. at 20-21. 
 
464 Id. 
 
465 See generally Statement of the Ad Hoc Committee of AMR Corporation Creditors 
In Support of Motion of Debtors for Entry of Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105(a), 
363(b), and 503(b) Authorizing and Approving (i) Merger Agreement Among AMR 
Corporation, AMR Merger Sub, Inc., and US Airways Group, Inc., (ii) Debtors’ 
Execution of and Performance Under Merger Agreement, (iii) Certain Employee 
Compensation and Benefit Arrangements, (iv) Termination Fees, and (v) Related 
Relief. Case 11-15463. Doc. No. 7233-1. 
 
466 Susan Carey, US Airways Chief Describes Biggest Challenges in AMR 
Settlement, WALL STREET JOURNAL (Dec. 1, 2013), https://perma.cc/6DXG-2L5P. 
 
467 Transcript of Hearing on August 15, 2013. Doc. No. 9903, p. 11. 
 
468 Id. 
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government argued that if this merger went through, four airlines would control over 
eighty percent of the U.S. market and essentially conceded its previous merger 
approvals involving the other legacy carriers had been a mistake.469 While both sides 
had recognized an antitrust suit was a possibility, attorneys and other advisors had 
kept in touch with Justice Department attorneys and came to the conclusion that an 
antitrust suit was unlikely.470 After all, four major airline mergers had passed 
through without any regulatory resistance since 2005.471 Moreover, the European 
Commission’s antitrust regulators approved the combination in early August with 
minor stipulations.472  
 
Yet, the suit came two days before a final hearing was to be held before the 
court regarding approval of the merger and confirmation of the plan. Consequently, 
Judge Lane felt uncomfortable moving forward with approval of the merger and 
sought legal briefs from the parties concerning whether the bankruptcy court had the 
legal authority to move forward with the merger and plan until the antitrust dispute 
was resolved.473 
 
 Because the plan was fully consensual, all parties felt comfortable moving 
ahead with approval of the plan’s substance at the August 15 hearing.474 Because the 
                                            
469 Susan Carey, Brent Kendall, and Jack Nicas, U.S. Moves to Block US Airways-
American Airlines Merger, WALL STREET JOURNAL (Aug. 13, 2013), 
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antitrust issue affected the effective date of the merger, along with other 
inconsequential details, the plan would need to be amended to account for those 
changes.475 As a result, the court decided to delay final approval of the plan until the 
appropriate changes could be negotiated and agreed upon.476 
 
The Justice Department’s suit had the practical effect of putting the debtors 
and US Airways in a vulnerable position. Stock prices in both airlines fell by more 
than sixteen percent on the day the lawsuit became public. AMR’s team, though 
invested in the deal and legally bound to fight for it, did not view the antitrust 
disapproval as an impediment to its long-term success because it remained 
ambivalent about entering into a merger with US Airways.477 Meanwhile, US 
Airways, the labor unions, and the creditors viewed such action as an existential 
threat.478 All parties recognized that the deal needed to close by December 2013, when 
the termination date would go into effect—making a contest in the courtroom that 
much more unlikely.479 The parties immediately embarked on a public relations 
campaign against the federal government. For example, the head of the APA said 
that “if the deal falls through, the Justice Department will have bolstered the duopoly 
of Delta and United" and promised to “employ a wide range of tactics” designed to get 
the public’s attention.480 The airlines and their employees also initiated an effective 
lobbying campaign, particularly with local and state officials.481 
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As a result of the effective lobbying campaign, it appears that settlement 
negotiations began shortly after the government first filed suit and that by 
November—just two weeks away from trial—the parties had reached a settlement.482 
According to analysts, the government’s position was “indefensible” since it had 
already blessed the outcome of the Delta and United “super-mergers.”483 The 
government agreed to drop the suit in exchange for minor divestitures.484 Under the 
agreement, both airlines would sell 104 takeoff and landing slots at Ronald Reagan 
National Airport, 34 slots at LaGuardia, and terminal access rights at Chicago 
O’Hare, Los Angeles International, Boston Logan International, Dallas Love Field, 
and Miami International.485 Ideally, both airlines were supposed to sell to low-cost 
carriers (or other non-network carriers); in practice, that did not always work out.486 
 
After the Justice Department settled with the debtors, a group of private 
individuals brought a similar antitrust suit under § 16 of the Clayton Antitrust Act. 
The court, along with all of the parties, viewed this as little more than a nuisance suit 
and quickly dismissed their objections to approving the settlement.487 On November 
27, 2013, Judge Lane approved the settlement and stipulated that it did not modify 
the plan to the extent that it would require a new vote by creditors and 
shareholders.488 
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C. The Merger Agreement 
1. The Basic Structure 
 The merger agreement was facilitated through a reverse triangular merger, 
where US Airways (a Delaware corporation) merged with a Merger Sub, a wholly-
owned subsidiary of AMR (a Delaware corporation).489 After the merger became 
effective, AMR changed its name to “American Airlines Group Inc.”490 As 
consideration for the merger, US Airways’ shareholders received twenty-eight 
percent of the diluted equity of the merged enterprise, with AMR’s shareholders 
receiving the remaining seventy-two percent in exchange for their current shares in 
AMR.491 Analysts valued the merged entity’s aggregate diluted equity at 
approximately eight billion dollars.492 The merger created a Transition Committee 
(managed by the CEOs of both AMR and US Airways) to oversee the integration of 
the two companies.493 
 
2. Key Benefits 
The merger created several benefits for all stakeholders. One of the more 
important benefits is that the merged company estimated it would save over one 
billion dollars in annual net synergies by eliminating duplicative functions, 
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equipment, and real estate.494 It also increased the company’s liquidity and borrowing 
capacity as a result of a combined balance sheet. Because the labor unions played an 
active role in the merger negotiations, the new entity benefitted from more cost-
effective collective bargaining agreements. Altogether, the combined airline now 
offers more than 6,700 daily flights to 336 destination in 56 countries.495 The 
combined airline now provides the greatest number of flights and city pair 
connections across the east coast—the “largest and most lucrative air travel market 
in the world.”496  
 
3. Significant Structural Details 
The Ad Hoc Committee got some of what they wanted in that half of the 
combined company’s new board was to be composed of directors to be designated by 
no less than 75% approval of the special Search Committee members. That Search 
Committee was made up of eight members, four of whom are designated by the OCC 
and the other four designated by the Ad Hoc Committee.497 Another five would come 
from the two former companies—two from AMR and three from US Airways. Finally, 
Tom Horton would become the Chairman of the Board of the merged company while 
Doug Parker would become the Vice-Chairman and CEO of the new company.498 
 
Both parties were required by law to seek shareholder approval of the merger. 
Additionally, the parties jointly filed a Form S-4 (relating to proposed business 
combinations of public corporations) with the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission.499 In conjunction with the stock exchange, AMR was responsible for 
getting the merged company’s common stock authorized for listing on the New York 
Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) and NASDAQ. US Airways was required to de-list its 
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stocks with the NYSE and any other securities markets on which its shares were 
listed.500 AMR structured the merger in conjunction with the plan so as to treat the 
transaction as a reorganization as defined in § 368(a) of the Internal Revenue Code. 
Reorganizations under § 368(a) are considered “tax free” and are therefore very 
attractive in the context of a merger.  
 
In order to guarantee support from the Ad Hoc Committee, the parties entered 
into a Support and Settlement Agreement which allowed for the new entity to settle 
some of its previous debts and guarantee a minimum distribution of 3.5% of the 
common equity to existing equity holders.501 According to the debtors, shareholders 
have never gotten a guaranteed distribution such as this in a Chapter 11 
restructuring.502 
 
Because the plan (and accompanying disclosure statement) and the merger 
were so inextricably integrated, US Airways played a significant role in the drafting 
and approval of the plan. The merged company engaged in an aggressive reduction 
of redundant staffing by offering attractive severance packages to certain categories 
of employees.503 
 
The merger contemplated continued indemnification and exculpation of 
directors in their capacity as board members. Interestingly enough, all directors (and 
their spouses and dependents) of the merged company continue to keep their first-
class flight privileges for all personal non-business related travel—a perk directors of 
both separate airline each enjoyed.504 
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X. Conclusion 
 When American Airlines went into bankruptcy protection in November 2011, 
many analysts (and concerned shareholders) feared the worst.505 Of course, several 
airlines had sought bankruptcy protection in recent years and fared well afterward. 
But this was American Airlines. The same airline that had entered into failed 
mergers in the past and did not always enjoy the good fortune its competitors often 
found. More to the point, bankruptcy protection usually means that shareholders are 
the “biggest losers.” As one analyst puts it: “Typically, the common stock becomes 
worthless when a company goes through the bankruptcy wash.”506  
 
 Yet, by April 2014—less than six months into final confirmation of the 
merger—American Airlines Group made the last of five distributions of its stock to 
all of its stakeholders—unsecured creditors, labor unions, claimants, and AMR 
shareholders.507 At that time, shareholders of the American Airlines Group who had 
previously owned AMR stock had seen a 135% return from share prices in December 
2011.508 By merging, American Airlines Group became the largest airline in the 
United States both in terms of capacity and revenue.509 
 
 After reviewing the docket and all pertinent documents relating to the 
restructuring and merger processes, it appears that AMR’s Chapter 11 experience 
was less painful than other typical restructurings precisely because the executive 
team made prudent—if not prescient—decisions along the way.  
 
First, after AMR’s unfortunate year in 2001—the failed TWA merger as well 
as the effects of 9/11—the airline soldiered through a decade of net losses while other 
airlines reached for the bankruptcy parachute much earlier. As a result, by the time 
American entered bankruptcy, the company had the good fortune to have learned 
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from the other airlines’ experiences in bankruptcy—and to have hired attorneys 
recently experienced in airline industry bankruptcies. 
 
Second, and perhaps most crucial, AMR entered bankruptcy before it was too 
late—and brought over four billion dollars of unrestricted cash with them. In doing 
this, AMR entered bankruptcy protection on its own terms. This liberated the 
company’s leadership to make long-term strategic decisions without needing to 
accommodate the short-term interests of a DIP lender.  
 
Third, AMR spent the decade before bankruptcy voluntarily trimming its 
excesses, working to become optimally efficient and cost-effective. This allowed AMR 
to create a discrete narrative that all would be made well once the airline enjoyed the 
same labor costs as its competitors. Consequently, AMR’s creditors and its labor 
unions were compelled to agree with AMR’s solutions—which in turn allowed AMR’s 
stakeholders to influence the merger. Moreover, it ensured that the Justice 
Department’s attempt at blocking the merger on antitrust grounds would be, at best, 
a pyrrhic victory. 
 
Today, American Airlines Group remains a global competitor in the airline 
industry and by 2015 had joined the S&P 500, a collection of the 500 largest and most 
profitable companies. AMR’s bankruptcy stands out among its peers as a model 
bankruptcy in almost every respect. 
